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Self-Organizing Legal Systems:
Precedent and Variation in Ba
ptcy•
Bernard Trujillo ••
Models of legal ordering are frequently hierarchical. These models do not
explain two prominent realities: (1) variation in the content ofa legal system, and
(2) patterns of non-hierarchical ordering that we observe. As a supplement to
hierarchical explanations oflegal order, this Article, drawing/rom physical and
social science research on complex systems, offers a self-organizing model. The
self-organizing model focuses on variation in the content of legal systems and
attempts to explain the relationship between that variation and patterns of
ordering. The self-organizing model demonstrates that variation and ordering are
not opposite categories, but rather constitute one continuous phenomenon.
Working with bankruptcy data and institutions, this Article describes selforganizing structures as overlapping networks oflegal and extra-legal actors, and
self-organizing dynamics as involving the twin processes ofform innovation and
norm emergence. This Article adduces empirical evidence (including a substantial
case study and statistical analysis of a quantitative database) showing that
bankruptcy is a self-organizing system. Finally, this Article suggests that selforganization may state a general theory oftrial court behavior, and that the selforganizing model may illuminate legal research in areas such as discretion,
doctrine, and legal change.
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I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS PRECEDENT?

Lawyers and legal insiders know what a precedent is. Precedents happen
every time a court takes a previously decided case as authority for disposing a yetto-be-decided case. From the insider's point of view, the more vital question is not
"what is precedent?" but rather "what is the precedent for my case?" and perhaps,
"how can I get around that precedent?"
Now consider the phenomenon of precedent from the perspective of an
outsider someone observing a legal system as she might observe an ecological
system or an economic system. From this perspective, precedents are utterances
that sort; that is, they allow players inside the legal system to categorize future
utterances, thereby channeling the trajectory of an ongoing stream of data. The
phenomenon at issue jn studying precedent, then, is the phenomenon of legal
ordering.
Taking the perspective of the outside observer, this Article asks: "What
1
explains the ordering of a legal system's content?" If there are any discernible
patterns among the data generated by a legal system, the thing to be explained is
"where do those patterns come from?"
There are at least three classifications of legal ordering. First, system content
2
can be disordered, meaning that there are no discernible patterns. Second, content
can be ordered by hierarchical means, such that hierarchical superiors (e.g.,
appellate courts or the President) issue directives· that are followed by hierarchical
inferiors (e.g., trial courts or administrative agencies). Finally, content can be selforganizing, meaning that we can explain patterns without primary reference to
exogenous events (such as the directive of a hierarchical superior).
Hierarchical models are the most conunon explanation oflegal ordering, and,
in fact, such models do a very good job of accounting for much of the order we
3
observe in legal systems. Our reliance on hierarchical explanations has, however,
had some unfortunate effects. The focus on hierarchical ordering corresponds with
a focus on appellate courts, so that trial courts' role in the ordering process is
often neglected in legal research. This bias in favor of appellate courts "is

1

The content of a legal system, defined broadly, includes any fonn in the legal system from
a judge's published opinions to her in-chambers meetings; from an attorney's informal strategies
and fonnal arguments, to a paralegal's route to the courthouse, to how late the clerk's office stays
open on Tuesdays. See infra Part III.C (defining fotnts and notms that make up system content). All
fonns are simply data that make up the system.
2
1t is likely that the vast majority of fonns that I would include as system content lack any
meaningful pattern. Disorder in system content can range from the relatively inconsequential to the
quite substantial (think, for example, of the loose'canon judge). While this Article is concerned with
the means of legal ordering, it is important to keep in mind that there is substantial disorder in legal
systems, and that such patternlessness imposes real costs upon system participants.
3
See infra Part IV.B (examining hierarchical means of ordering bankruptcy system).
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4

prominent in both theoretical expositions of precedent and empirical studies of
5
precedent. More troubling is the fact that a tendency to associate order with
hierarchy can entail an erroneous identification of order with hierarchy, such that,
6
when hierarchical means of ordering are defective, one comes to expect disorder.

.
4

See, e.g., RUPERTCROSS&J.W. HARRIS,PRECEDENTINENGLISHLAW 5 (4thed. 1991). This

basic text on precedent in common law systems represents that the "three constant features'' of
precedent are: "[T]he respect paid to a single decision of a superior court, the fact that a decision
of such a court is a persuasive precedent even so far as the courts above that from which it emanates
are concerned, and the fact that a single decision is always a binding precedent as regards courts
below that from which it emanated." /d. The role of trial courts, in Cross' account of precedent, is
thus known only by negative inference: trial courts respect and are bound by appellate court
decisions because trial courts are located "below" appellate courts. See_ id.
5
Many important empirical studies of precedent draw their data exclusively from the behavior
of appellate courts. See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century ofStyle and
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REv. 773, 773-74 (1981); Peter Harris, Ecology and Culture in the
Communication ofPrecedent Among State Supreme Courts 1870-1970, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 449,
451 ( 1985); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner~ Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 252 (1976); John Henry Merryman, The Authority of
Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950,6 STAN. L. REV. 613,650-51 (1954);
John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory ofCitations: An Empirical Study ofthe Citation Practice
of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381 (1977).
Excellent empirical studies of trial courts (and other first-instance dispute resolution institutions),
on the other hand, represent themselves as case studies of participant or institutional behavior, rather
than as studies of the dynamics by which a legal system's content is ordered. See Richard Lempert,
More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute Settlement Function" of Trial
Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'YREV. 91, 130-31 (1978); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do
Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept ofDispute, 9 JUST. Svs. J. 151, 151, 157 (1984); Austin
Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & Soc'v
REV. 93, _93, 95-96 (1986); Barbara Yngvesson, Legal Ideology and Community Justice in the
Clerk's Office, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 71, 73-74 (1985).

The id~ntification of hierarchy with the good of order is what John Griffiths would call oo
"ideological" rather than an "empirical" position. See John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24
J. LEGAL PLURALISM I, 3 ( 1986). Ideology, according to Griffiths, is a "mixture of assertions about
how the world ought to be and a priori assumptions about how it actually and even necessarily is."
/d. Empirical (or "descriptive," or "scientific") approaches to the study of law, on the other hand,
take the phenomenon as the primary object of study, without entertaining questions about how the
phenomenon ought to be or what it must "necessarily" be. See id. at 4-5. See also Marc Galanter,
The Portable Soc 2; or, What to Do until the Doctrine Comes, in GENERAL EDUCATION IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE COLLEGE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
246,251-53 (John J. MacAloon ed., 1992) [hereinafter Galanter, The Portable Soc 2]. Galanter lists
eight propositions of conventional legal studies, and notes that the listed propositions
have a dual, composite character, fusing both descriptive and normative. They are
thought to state what is normal and typical in legal systems to reflect the inherent and
proper shape of legal reality. This fusion of factual and norn1ative assertion
. . . establishes them as ideological statements statements about what a legal
system ... ought to be like.
/d. Studies of precedent and legal ordering are generally characterized by an "ideological"
approach. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 51.
6
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We can indeed explain a great deal about legal ordering by studying appellate
court behavior and tracking hierarchical mechanics. But such a focus is partial,
and therefore limiting and potentially distracting. When our travels are guided by
7
incomplete maps, we are continually blindsided by the rest ofreality.
Two
prominent (and intimately related) realities are not explained by hierarchical
models of legal ordering: ( 1) Variation . I will argue that the characteristic feature
of a legal system's content is variation, and that this variation c~nnot adequately
be explained by models of appellate control. (2) Non-hierarchical ordering. I will
argue that the U . S . . bankruptcy legal system presents a situation in which the
mechanisms of hierarchical ordering and appellate control are substantially
defective, and yet we observe significant ordering of the legal system's content.
What accounts for ordering when hierarchy is defective or under-explanatory? We
need a supplemental, non-hierarchical, model to explain more fully the
phenomenon of legal ordering.
This Article attempts to explain legal ordering among actors in the trial8
oriented sectors of a legal system, with a focus on bankruptcy law. As a
supplement to hierarchical models, I offer a self-organizing model of legal
systems.
Part II presents the hierarchical model of legal ordering as a pyramid. It tests
the hierarchical model against evidence generated by the bankruptcy system and
finds that the model does not explain
the evidence. The behavior of the
.
bankruptcy system is more complex than the simple hierarchical model predicts.
Part II concludes by confronting the fact of variation a central feature of legal
systems and a feature that hierarchical models of ordering cannot explain.
Part III reviews the responses to variation that have constituted much of
contemporary jurisprudence, and suggests a different research direction in which
variation is the starting point of a constructive inquiry. It then reviews the
literature on "local legal cultures" both in and beyond bankruptcy. Part III also
interprets the existence of local legal cultures to be evidence of non-hierarchical
ordering (i.e., the systematization ofcontent variation such that variation becomes
navigable), and asks how such ordering occurs.
Part IV offers a self-organizing model of legal systems. Building on several
lines of research from the physical and social sciences, it details an account of
non-hierarchical legal ordering that explains (a) self-organizing structures as
overlapping networks made up of actors connected by ties of varying strengths;
and (b) self-organizing dynamics, comprising (1) an account of how multiple
forms are generated (thus constituting variable system content); and (2) an account

1

See Galanter, Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 250-51 (developing "bad maps" analogy).
8
This Article explores the phenomenon of ordering in the context of bankruptcy courts, but
the means of ordering observed there are also active in other types of courts, beyond court systems
(e.g., in administrative agencies and legislative bodies), and in bureaucracy generally. See infra Part
V.B.
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of how particular fortns become norms (i.e., come to characterize system content),
thus ordering system content. The model clarifies the relationship between
variation and order, by showing how order proceeds from variation in the absence
of hierarchical commands.
.
Part V applies the self-organizing model to U.S. bankruptcy law. It shows
how bankruptcy's networks are self-organizing structures. It presents empirical
evidence offortn innovation and norm emergence in bankruptcy, drawing on (1)
an extensive case study, and (2) statistical analysis of a quantitative database.
Finally, Part V suggests that the self-organizing model extends beyond
bankruptcy and states a general theory of legal ordering. This Article concludes
with preliminary thoughts on how the self-organizing model might illuminate
three basic problems of legal research: discretion, doctrine, and legal change.
•
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II. HIERARCHICAL ORDERING AND THE FACT OF VARIATION

A. The Pyramid Story

•

Supreme Court

Intermediate AppeUate Courts

Trial Courts

What explains the ordering ofa legal system's content? As we have seen, one
9
valid way of answering this question is by reference to hierarchical mechanics.

~eliance on hierarchical mechanics is part of the more general bias of linearity in scientific

measurement and explanation. Hierarchical models of legal ordering assert a proportional
relationship between input variables and output variables the sort of relationship among variables
that mathematics calls "linear." See DANIEL KAPLAN & LEON GLASS,, UNDERSTANDING NONLINEAR
DYNAMICS 3-8 (1995); STEVEN H. STROGATZ, NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND CHAOS: WITH
APPLICATIONS TO PHYSICS, BIOLOGY, CHEMISTRY, AND ENGINEERING 6 {Addison-Wesley 1994).
The self-organizing model, presented infra Part IV.C., would allow (in its mathematical
representations) for disproportional relationships among variables. Richard Abel, in a 1973 article,
anticipated legal studies' tum to nonlinear models. See Richard L. Abel, Law Books and Books
about Law, 26 STAN. L. REv. 175, 189 ( 1973) (suggesting that legal studies should "begin the
construction of a more complex model in which law and behavior interact without a one-to-one
correspondence") (book review).
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Hierarchical explanations of adjudicative ordering tell a story about appellate
control. Figure 1 displays the prototypical explanatory image: a three-storied
pyramid of adjudication consisting of a supreme court at the top, intermediate
appellate courts in the middle, and trial courts at the base. A pyramid explanation
of legal ordering takes the following fortn: suppose an open doctrinal question
(e.g., if old equity contributes new value, can it participate in the plan contrary to
10
the absolute priority rule?). Myriad cases are decided at the lowest levels of factfinding, none more precedential than the others. These cases state a variety of
12
11
answers to the open doctrinal question (e.g., "yes,'' "no," "only if there was an
14
13
auction first," "only if the new value was over a certain sum," "only if the new
15
value met this list of five conditions," etc.). These answers fill up the very many
compartments constituting the broad base of the pyramid. Some of these cases are
pushed up the pyramidal appellate structure, sending precedents back down as
they ascend. One case gets decided by an intermediate appellate court and, as a
result, a certain number of answers to the open doctrinal question become
unavailable in a certain geography. This process continues until the ultimate court
at the top of the pyramid answers the question. That answer travels down every
level and enters every compartment of the pyramid, exalting one resolution and
16
exterminating the rest. Swords flash. Screams pierce the night. Then the hubbub
of the pyramid subsides into silence. The pyramid is unifortn, the law is settled.

10

This is a question of bankruptcy doctrine that was allegedly resolved by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass 'n. v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Partnership, 526 U.S. 434, 457 (1999). The bankruptcy jargon translates as follows: "Old equity"
describes the owners or shareholders of the corporation prior to the bankruptcy filing. See In re
Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 1993). ''New value" most typically describes an
injection of cash into the corporation after it has filed for bankruptcy, usually to help fund the
corporation's plan of reorganization. /d. The "absolute priority rule" is a section of the Bankruptcy
Code that requires the bankrupt corporation's reorganization plan to provide either full repayment
to the parties that had unsecured claims against the corporation prior to bankruptcy, or no payment
to old equity. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2000). The point of the absolute priority rule is to
discourage old equity, who often write the plan, from retaining value at the expense of the finn's
creditors. The policy behind the "new value exception" to the absolute priority rule is to force old
equity to pay for retaining value in the reorganized finn. See Walter W. Miller, Jr., Bankruptcy's
New Value Exception: No Longer a Necessity, 77 B.U. L. REv. 975,978-79 (1997).
11
See, e.g., In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d at 918.
12
See, e.g., In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners, L.P., 138 F.3d 39,46 (2d Cir. 1998).
13
See, e.g., In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1010 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
14
See, e.g., In re Elmwood, Inc., 182 B.R. 845, 852-53 (D. Nev. 1995) (requiring that new
capital infusion be ''substantial" under the circumstances).
15
See, e.g., In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 126 F.3d 955, 963 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding new
value exception applies only if contribution of new capital is"( 1) new, (2) substantial, (3) necessary
for the success of the plan, (4) reasonably equivalent to the value retained, and ( 5) in the fonn of
money or money's worth").
16
0n the "extennination" features of law, see Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4, 40 44 (1983).
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And that is the pyramid story. In this model, ordering occurs by means of a
fortnal hierarchical structure. Significantly, this model predicts that if the fortnal
mechanics of hierarchy was disrupted if, for example, the appellate courts did
not exert substantial control over trial court doctrine then one would observe a
substantial lack of ordering in that legal system.

B. Testing the Pyramid: Bankruptcy Law
The pyramid story presents a hierarchical model of legal ordering. Now we
test that model and its predictions by comparing the pyramid story to the workings
of a real legal system: U.S. bankruptcy law. Our intention is to determine whether
the pyramid model of ordering is an accurate representation of actual system
ordering.
A brief introduction to the chief features of the bankruptcy legal system is
appropriate. Bankruptcy law is federal law, with a very complicated and
comprehensive statute known as the "Bankruptcy Code" that occupies the entirety
ofTitle 11 of the United States Code. Bankruptcy has its own courts ("bankruptcy
18
17
courts") staffed by Article I judges ("bankruptcy judges") who are typically
highly trained in the complex field. These judges are appointed to fourteen-year
19
terms by the regional court of appeals. Finally, opinions of bankruptcy courts are
reported by West Publishing, and are easily accessible.
One feature of the bankruptcy system is of particular interest here: the
bankruptcy appellate structure generates very few decisions that bind future cases
as a matter of formal, hierarchical precedent. The vast majority of decisions in
bankruptcy serve as nothing more than the law of the case. Indeed, the common
wisdom of bankruptcy scholars and professionals is that the bankruptcy system
20
in the U.S. makes too little precedent. As the balance of this Article will show,
I believe that characterization is controversial. But it is an unquestionably correct
observation that nearly all bankruptcy cases terminate at a level where no fortnal
21
precedent is made. There are very few appeals out of bankruptcy court, and only
an infinitesimal number of cases are appealed to the level where the results
22
formally bind other bankruptcy judges.
Two facts constitute this bankruptcy appeals problem. First, only opinions
of the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court bind bankruptcy courts
by reason of formal hierarchy. Second, there are dramatically few opinions from

28 u.s.c. § 151 (2000).
18
/d. § 152.
19Jd.
20
See infra text accompanying notes 36-39, 43-52.
21 See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1091 (1994).
22ld.
17
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the U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court relative to the total number
of bankruptcy cases in the system. These two facts are discussed in the next two
sections with the aid of figures.

1. The institutional glitch in the bankruptcy appeals process

Fi&ure 2

United States Supreme Court

.. . Fifth

level 0

Eighth

Sixth

Ninth •..

level(

Seventh Circuit

Indiana

Illinois

Wisconsin

Dist.Ct.#l

Shabaz

Oist.Ct.#2
Crabb

Bankruptcy Ct. 11 Bankruptcy Ct. #2
Martin

Utschig

Oist.Ct.#l

Oist.Ct.#2

Randa

Oist.Ct.#3
Clevert

Dist.Ct.#4
Adelman

Bankruptcy Ct. #1 Bankruptcy Ct.i2 Bankruptcy Ct. #3
Eisenberg
Shapiro
McGarity

level 8

level A

Figure 2 depicts a segment of the federal court system, showing for
illustrative purpos.e s the projected appellate path of a bankruptcy action initiated
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23

in Wisconsin. A litigant would begin in a bankruptcy court in Wisconsin ("Level
24
A" in the Figure), move up to the district courts of Wisconsin ("Level B"), then
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ("Level C''), and finally to
the U.S. Supreme Court ("Level D"). The bankruptcy appeals problem comes
from the fact that every decision by every court in Level A and Level B creates
nothing more than the law of the case. Unremarkably, the decision of one judge
does not bind another judge horizontally, along either Level A (Martin cannot
bind Utschig) or Level B (Crabb cannot bind Shabaz). More surprising is the fact
that one judge cannot bind another vertically, from Level B to Level A (i.e.,
decisions by Crabb do not bind Martin, except for decisions in those particular
cases actually appealed from Martin to Crabb). The first point at which a court
might utter something more than the law of the case is at Level C, by the U.S.
25
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. If a litigant in Madison believes it has
an important bit of law to clarify, it would have to first file and litigate at Level

23

The "bankruptcy appellate panel" (''BAP") is not illustrated in,Figure 2. The BAP is a panel
of three bankruptcy judges that can hear appeals, on the consent of both parties, from the decision
of bankruptcy courts. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 5.02[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2003) [hereinafter 1 COLLIER]. Appeals from BAPs go to the courts of
app_eals (BAPs would.thus displace district courts as "Level B" in the figure). See id. ~ 5.02[4].
Despite an express congressional policy in favor of BAPs, only the First and Ninth Circuits make
full use ofBAPs. /d.~ 5.02[3]. Four circuits (Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth) make limited use
of BAPs, and six circuits (Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C.) have decided not to
have SAPs. /d.; NAT'LBANKR. REV. COMM'N, 1 REPORTOFTHENATIONALBANKRUPTCYREVIEW
COMMISSION § 3.13(F)-(H), at 764--66 ( 1997) (hereinafter 1 NBRC REPORT]. BAPs do not help to
consolidate doctrine in the bankruptcy system because the BAP opinion, just like the bankruptcy
court opinion and the district court opinion, states only the law of the case.and does not bind future
cases as a matter of hierarchy. See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved
issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 531 (1995)
("[W]hatever arguments can be made. ~n support of the creation of a bankruptcy appellate panel, the
development of binding precedent is not one of them.").
24
Bankruptcy courts are technically departments of federal district courts. 1 COLLIER, supra
note 23, ~ 2.02[ 1]. The 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code gave bankruptcy judges broad
jurisdiction, but did not grant them Article III status. !d. ~ 2.0 I [2][b]. In 1982 the U.S. Supreme
Court found that arrangement unconstitutional. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding unconstitutional Congress' grant of broad jurisdiction to nonArticle III bankruptcy judges). Congress responded in 1984 by enacting a complicated jurisdictional
scheme that clarified the fact that bankruptcy court jurisdiction was dependent upon a grant of
district court jurisdiction. 1 COLLIER, supra note 23, 1J3.0 I [2][b].
25
The proposed "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003"
contains a provision that would allow decisions ofba~ptcy courts to be directly appealed to the
courts of appeals, thus bypassing the costly stopover at the district court. See H.R. 975, 108th Cong.
§ 1233 (2003) (proposing to amend 28 U ..S.C. § 158 to allow direct appeals). See generally Judith
A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative_ Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 625,625-26 (2002) (discussing findings ofstudy conducted by Federal Judicial Center
and possible policy prescriptions).
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A, then appeal and litigate at Level B, and then appeal and litigate at Level C.
Only after two appeals and three levels of litigation might the litigant achieve a
judgment that will bind future cases as a matter of the fonnal operation of
27
hierarchical precedent.
This feature of bankruptcy appellate structure is perhaps explained by the
28
relationship between federal district courts and bankruptcy courts. Since
bankruptcy courts are formally departments of district courts, one could say that
there is no vertical dimension describing bankruptcy courts and district courts.
The surprising lack of vertical precedent is really just a function of the
29
unremarkable lack ofhorizontalprecedent among district courts. But bankruptcy
court judges, while fortnally identified with the district courts, are not actually
identical to district court judges. Fonnally, bankruptcy judges are like the federal
magistrates appointed by district courts, in that they exercise authority granted to
30
them by the district court. But actually, bankruptcy judges maintain a judicial
identity substantially separate from district court judges. Congress has created a
31
court system containing multiple judicial personalities within the same identity.
It is perhaps unsurprising that this creature has behaved pathologically.

26

lt is possible for bankruptcy actions to initiate in district court in those circumstances where
the district court has expressly "withdrawn the reference," i.e., the standing device that sends all
cases filed under Title II to the bankruptcy court qua department of the district court. See I
COLLIER, supra note 23,, 3.02[1]. Withdrawing the reference is extremely unusual. So as a general
matter, bankruptcy cases begin (and, as we will see, almost always end) in bankruptcy court.
27
Bankruptcy litigants best positioned to make law by pursuing appeals are thus limited to the
sophisticated, the well-funded, and the repeat players: viz. participants in business bankruptcies and
corporate lenders in the consumer market (such as lenders on car loans and credit cards).
28
Reasons for the lack of hierarchical precedent running vertically from district courts to
bankruptcy courts (along with norntative arguments urging bankruptcy court judges to be good
sports and act as if they were bound by district courts) have been explored elsewhere. See generally
Busse!, supra note 21, at 1064 (arguing for "functional inquiry into the comparative advantages and
disadvantages of various bodies in a non-traditionally organized adjudicative system"); John P.
Hennigan, Jr., Appealability Regularized: The NBRC's Proposals and Current Legislative Issues,
7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 415 passim (1998) (discussing and recommending changes of finality
requirement for appeals from bankruptcy courts); Jeffrey J. Brookner, Note, Bankruptcy Courts and
Stare Decisis: The Needfor Restructuring, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 313,327-28 (1993) (arguing
that bankruptcy courts should follow district court precedent); John H. Maddock III, Note,
Stemming the Tide of Bankruptcy Court Independence: Arguing the Case for District Court
Precedent, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 507 passim (1994) (same).
29
/n re Rheuban, 128 B.R. 551,555 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor (In
re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236,241-43 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. I99I); see Bussel, supra note 2I, at 1071;
see also Honorable Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes ofDelay and Expense in Chapter
11 Bankruptcy Cases, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287,296-97 (1993) (noting it takes two appeals to create

precedent).
30

See 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2000).
31
See supra note 24 (Congress' response to Marathon case).
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2. The near void offormally precedential bankruptcy opinions
Figure 3
(see following page)
•

Figure 3 is a rough proportional representation of the number of cases
32
disposed at each of the four levels of the system. These data are from 2001. As
shown in Figure 3, at the bankruptcy court level (i.e., "Level A") for that year
there were 1,43 7,354 cases; at the district court level (i.e., "Level B") there were
2519; at the court of appeals level (i.e., "Level C") there were 482 cases; at the
33
Supreme Court level (i.e., "Level D") there was one case. The data are arrayed
in Figure 3 in the shape of a very bottom-heavy pyramid, with the Supreme Court
case occupying the small pointy head of the pyramid and the bankruptcy court
34
cases occupying the broad, wildly disproportionate base of the pyramid.

32

2001 ADMlN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS. ANN. REP., JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 75 tbl.B-1, 133 tbl.C2-A, 257 tbl.F,
available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS].
33
The sole U.S. Supreme Court case that year was Gitlitz v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 531 U.S. 206, 215- 16 (200 1) (discussing tax consequences of bankruptcy discharge).
More typically, there are two or three bankruptcy cases on the U.S. Supreme Court docket in any
•
g1ven year.
34
A very important qualification is needed h~re: counting bankruptcy cases will both
overcount and undercount bankruptcy disputes. In bankruptcy, a case is everything brought before
the court in the matter of a particular debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-304. In big business bankruptcy,
there could be hundreds of disputes brought under the umbrella of a single case. In consumer
bankruptcy, there are many thousands of cases filed, but very few of them result in the adjudication
of an actual dispute. The closest measure we have for actual disputes in bankruptcy is the annual
number of adversary proceedings. See FED. R. BANKR. P ., 700 1-7087. See generally Elizabeth
Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (Forthcoming
2004). For 2001, there were 67,140 adversary proceedings initiated in bankruptcy courts, of which
all but 8079 were tenninated in bankruptcy courts. JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 32, 263 tbl.F-8.
The data do not support a conclusion regarding how many of the 8079 were appealed past the
district court level, i.e., to the point where the court of appeals could issue a hierarchically binding
precedent. If you replace the data on cases with the data on adversary proceedings, the general
point stands (i.e., there are more non-precedential than precedential decisions), but the dramatic
nature of the statistics weakens.
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Fieure 3
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•

Combining the lesson of Figure 2 (only Level C and Level D opinions create
precedents that bind future decisions as a matter of fortnal hierarchical precedent)
with the lesson of Figure 3 (nearly all of the cases are at Level A and, to a much
smaller extent, Level B) suggests that there may be a dearth of hierarchically
precedential opinions in U.S. bankruptcy law. One way to sullllnarize the
combined lessons of the two figures is to look at the proportion of hierarchically
precedential cases in the system (483) to the non-hierarchically precedential cases
(1 ,439,873), which describes a ratio of .0003354. That is, there are just over three
one-hundredths of one percent as many hierarchically precedential cases as there
35
are cases that never make law.

35

Despite the extreme nature of this ratio, there is likely nothing unusual about the distribution
of cases represented in Figure 3. The ratio ofprecedent cases to law-of-the-case cases in bankruptcy
is probably substantially similar to the ratio in other substantive bodies of law. I claim not that
bankruptcy law is unique, but rather that bankruptcy presents a useful case study of a general
phenomenon: viz. the limits of hierarchy for explaining the ordering of legal content. See infra Part
IV.B.
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Various reasons have been advanced to explain why nearly all bankruptcy
cases tertninate in bankruptcy court. One obvious reason is that the extra layer of
appeals creates a financial disincentive for the party choosing a litigation
36
strategy. There are also significant procedural hurdles to appeal: the doctrines
37
38
of finality and mootness deliver a potent one-two punch to any litigant wishing
to pursue a litigation strategy that involves appeals. Bankruptcy cases are typically
sprawling, complicated affairs, with very few isolatable parts. Frequently it is
difficult to get a final, appealable judgment on any part of a bankruptcy case until
the point at which the entire case is resolved. But often by the time an issue
39
achieves finality, an appeal on that issue would be barred as moot.
Alongside these important technical reasons for the lopsided distribution of
cases within the bankruptcy system are two reasons which might be tertned
cultural. First, bankruptcy is understood in legal culture to be an intricate and
complicated specialty subject, something along the order of tax law. Most nonbankruptcy practitioners would delightedly go an entire career without ever
having to pick up a copy of the Bankruptcy Code, and district court judges are
often only too happy to farm out the bankruptcy cases on the docket. On the
remarkably rare occasion that a bankruptcy case is successfully appealed to the
rarefied atmosphere of a court of appeals or the Supreme Court, the bankruptcy
issues in the case are often not engaged at all. As often as not, the appellate court
will use the bankruptcy case as a vehicle to talk about something else, most
40
typically separation of powers, federalism, and statutory interpretation.
Bankruptcy cases stay in bankruptcy courts, on this account, because bankruptcy
issues gravitate to the point where they are understood and properly addressed.
The second cultural reason that bankruptcy cases stay in bankruptcy court
involves what might be called the self-adjusting nature of bankruptcy

36

See Rhodes, supra note 29 (noting that it takes two appeals to get precedent).
37
A trial court ruling is not appealable until the litigation is concluded on the merits via the
entry of a judgment. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); 15A-B CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3905-3915 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp.
2003).
'
38
A trial court ruling is not appealable if its adjudication has been rendered moot or
unnecessary by the operation of other events. In a complex bankruptcy case, issues are regularly
rendered moot through ancillary rulings by the court that reduce or eliminate the amount of the
claim or the size of the estate that would have been used to satisfy the claim.
39
See Busse], supra note 21, at 1070 ("It is an irony of bankruptcy practice that an order may
be non-appealable on finality grounds until it becomes non-appealable on mootness grounds!''). See
also Daniel J. Busse I, Textualism 's Failures: A Study ofOverruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 887, 918-19 (2000) [hereinafter Bussel, Failures] (same).
40
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (statutory
construction); see, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 45 (1994) (federalism);
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753,757,762 ( 1992) (separation of powers, statutory construction);
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,414 (1992) (statutory construction). The troubled relationship
between bankruptcy courts and appellate courts is studied more fully infra Part V.A.2.
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adjudication. Bankruptcy cases, sprawling, complicated, with multiple parties and
myriad interrelated issues, are as often "hashed out" in the presence of the judge
41
as they are decided by the judge. Parties do not appeal out of bankruptcy court
because they value the flexibility of the forum and they prefer to negotiate for
what they want. Bankruptcy judges directing these proceedings are called upon
42
to be both managers and umpires.

C. The Broken Pyramid: Variation
We have seen that bankruptcy's institutional conditions make it difficult to
generate a hierarchically binding precedent and that, indeed, the system generates
very few. But we have not yet made the case that the hierarchical mechanics of
appellate control fails to order fully the content of the bankruptcy legal system.
Figure 3 shows a very bottom-heavy pyramid, but it may not necessarily show
that the appellate mechanism in bankruptcy is malfunctioning. The fact that such
a great proportion of all bankruptcy cases terminate in bankruptcy court could
actually indicate the opposite of a malfunctioning appellate mechanism: one
would expect that, in a working hierarchical system, there would be very few
appeals because the law is uniforn1, settled, and transparent.
To complete the argument that the bankruptcy pyramid is broken, that the
hierarchical mechanism does not fully explain ordering, we must observe not only
a low number of cases that bind as a matter of hierarchy, but also a substantial
amount of variation in the way that different bankruptcy courts resolve identical
issues. The consensus among bankruptcy practitioners, doctrinal scholars, and
43
empirical scholars is that we do indeed observe such variation. This clear fact of

41

See Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 245, 246

( 1991 ). Jones states that:
[B]ankruptcy, unlike ordinary civil litigation, contains self-adjusting aspects that may
make appeals unnecessary. Many of the court's decisions are discretionary and hence
revocable. Moreover, in the natural course of a bankruptcy proceeding, an early adverse
decision suffered by a party may be corrected during negotiations or decisions in a later
part of the case.
/d.
42

See generally E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution ofProcedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 306, 322-26 (1986) (discussing evolution of managerial judging); Stacy Kleiner
Humphries & Robert L.R. Munden, Painting a Self-Portrait: A Look at the Composition and Style
of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 74 (1997) (contrasting traditional role of judges
as "umpires" with trend toward "managerial judging"); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REv. 374, 376-80 (1982) (discussing shift of judges toward managerial role).
43
Variation in bankruptcy system content is discussed extensively infra Parts III.A.l and
III.B.l. See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 23, at 526-27 (noting that there is lack of settled rules
in bankruptcy law); Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,
67 AM. BANKR.L.J. 501,532 (1993) (chronicling floor variation between cities); Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1498,
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variation is, however, open to a range of interpretations. And that is where things
get interesting.

Ill.
.,

•

RESPONSES TO VARIATION
•

•

A. Interpreting Variation

Variation has been the touchstone of much of modem jurisprudence. We
have noticed variation and tried to ignore it; we have declared it a threat to the
rule of law that must be exterminated; we have tried politely to explain it away;
we have wielded it like a hammer to smash the system and begin again.
Taking bankruptcy law as a case study, this Part discusses some
interpretations of the fact of variation in legal systems, and then suggests a
different approach.
1. Variation as pathology or passing thing

Upon observing variation in the doctrinal content of bankruptcy law, many
scholars and practitioners interpret that variation as incoherence comprising a per
se threat to the rule of law. The Report of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission ("NBRC") provides an excellent vantage point from which to glean
44
the received wisdom regarding the state of bankruptcy law. In the section of the
NBRC's report recommending direct appeals of bankruptcy matters to a court of
45
appeals, the NBRC anxiously treats the question of appellate control. After
46
detailing the structural characteristics in the bankruptcy appellate process, the
NBRC proclaims that "[s]tare decisis is a fundamental tenet of our common law

1506-07 ( 1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads] (discussing systematic legal
differences between cities); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Demographics ofBankruptcy, 63 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 289 (1989) (discussing demographics of bankruptcy practice); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The
Persistence ofLocal Legal Culture: Twenty Years ofEvidencefrom the Federal Bankruptcy Courts,
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 804 (1994) [hereinafter Sullivan et al., Persistence] (discussing
"local legal authority"); Symposium on Uniformity ofBankruptcy, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. I
( 1998); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as
Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397,
406-09 (1994) (noting "extreme variation in filing rates around the country").
44
In 1994, Congress commissioned the NBRC to prepare a report on the nation's bankruptcy
laws. 1 NBRC REPORT, supra note 23, at iv-vi. In October of 1997, after fifteen months of
numerous public hearings and meetings, the NBRC submitted its report to Congress. /d. While the
specific recommendations for reform were hotly contested and ultimately politicized in a highstakes and richly funded lobbying effort by the credit industry, the NBRC's report is taken to be the
most comprehensive recent survey regarding the status of U.S. bankruptcy. ld. at vi- vii.
45
!d. § 3. 13, at 752-54.
46/d.
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system" and that the "problems that arise from a lack of effective stare decisis .
47
. . can not be overestimated. " The NBRC continues:
Without a predictable outcome on even the most basic issues,
negotiations outside of court are skewed, creating more litigation.
Currently, case law can be found to support virtually any position on
any issue and as a result, wasteful litigation ensues.
Many ... bankruptcy court opinions are published in a separate West
and other reporters devoted to bankruptcy cases. Many bankruptcy
opinions from the district courts are also published. The consequence
is that about fourteen volumes of opinions of West's Reporter alone,
few of which are binding on any other future case, are published each
year. Practitioners assert that it is possible to find a bankruptcy opinion
to support any legal proposition and any side of a legal proposition. As
a result, no binding precedent exists in some circuits on certain
48
fundamental bankruptcy issues.
The practice of bankruptcy law, it would seem, must be in a very un-law-like
state of perpetual and fundamental uncertainty. In this view, bankruptcy law is a
sort of war zone, and its practitioners can most often be found hiding beneath their
49
desks waiting fearfully for the next totally unpredictable event. There is no
shortage ofcommentators proclaiming the fundamental incoherence ofbankruptcy
law, and examples can be multiplied. 5°
.I

/d. § 3.13, at 754 (emphasis added). The NBRC uses the term ~~stare decisis" to refer to the
principle by which judicial decisions bind the proceedings of hierarchically inferior courts. See id.
48
/d. § 3.13, at 754-55 (citing Baisier & Epstein, supra note 23, at 526-27 n.9). See also
Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role ofPrecedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform
ofthe Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 173, 199 (2000) ("[T]he worst thing to happen to bankruptcy practice was the decision in 1978
to begin publishing bankruptcy judges' opinions .... [O]ne can find authority in the case law these
days for virtually any proposition.").
49
A less dramatic version of the perpetual uncertainty thesis manifests itself in the anecdotal
understanding that "courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity." Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 304-08 (1939). This notion that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity is widely held
despite its extremely tenuous provenance. See HonoraQle Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy
Court is a Court of Equity H: What Does that Mean?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 277-86 (1999)
(demonstrating that bankruptcy courts are substantially unrelated to traditions of equity in
development of U.S. law).
50
See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 23, at 526-28 n.9 (listing as examples of incoherence lack
of resolution on four important issues in business bankruptcies); Bussel, supra note 21, at 1076-77
(listing ten areas where bankruptcy court has disagreed with district court or BAP decision on same
issue); Rhodes, supra note 29, at 290-93 (listing unresolved issues); Daniel J. Bussel, Bankruptcy
Appellate Reform: Issues and Options, 1995-1996 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 257,261-62 (listing five
areas of "unsettled law").
47
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I suggest that reports of bankruptcy law's disintegration have been greatly
exaggerated. Later I shall show that the variation in bankruptcy doctrine exhibits
concrete and navigable patterns, but for now it is interesting to wonder what
explains the diagnoses of the doomsayers. Why are these people projecting
incoherence on this legal system? .The answer, I believe, is that they are seeing
what they expect to see. They subscribe to a hierarchical mechanics explanation
51
ofprecedential ordering, a sort ofprecedent ex machina. If one identifies order
with hierarchy, and then one notices that the hierarchy is defective, then one
anticipates disorder. Thus the conviction of those who maintain that a legal system
with a malfunctioning appellate mechanism is a system doomed to doctrinal
incoherence. Precedent, on this view, is a product of hierarchy. If there is no
2
hierarchy, there can be no precedent. Chaos closes in. 5

51

This account of precedent is the dominant theory among mainstream legal theory. See, e.g.,
IB JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 0.401, at 1-2 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1996) ("As applied in a hierarchical system of courts, the duty of a subordinate court
to follow the laws as announced by superior courts is theoretically absolute."). For contemporary
examples of legal and social science scholars assuming hierarchy as an unargued and essential facet
of the legal system, see Bussel, supra note 21, at 1074 (characterizing some bankruptcy court
opinions to hold that ''the rule of stare decisis is a deduction from the hierarchical nature of the
judicial system and a related interest in judicial economy"); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994) (justifying the
"longstanding doctrine [that] dictates that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established
by a court 'superior' to it"); Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal
Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 L. & Soc. REV. 143, 143-44 (2003) ("[T]he federal
judicial hierarchy is designed to enable the Supreme Court, sitting at the system's apex, to impose
its collective will on lower federal judges."); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a ResourceConstrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1605,
1607-08 (1995) (explaining features he observes "[i]n virtually all judicial systems," viz. the
'
"vertical aspects of a system of precedent [in which] the lower (courts are obliged] to follow the
decisions of a higher court"). The commitment to the "hierarchical nature of the judicial system"
that characterizes the above-cited works is what Griffiths would call an ideological position, i.e.,
'
a "mixture of assertions about how the world ought to be and a priori assumptions about how it
actually and even necessarily is .... " See Griffiths, supra note 6, at 3. Galanter's list of eight
ideological propositions that dominate conventional legal scholarship contains an entry on
hierarchy. See Galanter, The Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 252 ("6. Normative statements,
institutions, and officials are arranged in hierarchies, whose members have different levels of
authority. A. 'Higher' elements direct (design, evaluate) activity; 'lower' ones execute activity. B.
Higher elements control (guide) lower ones.").
52
See, e.g., Busse I, supra note 21, at l 087-88.
[D ]elegating [the job of being the principal expositors ofbankruptcy law] to bankruptcy
courts results in chaotic law development. No mechanism for reconciling disparate
'reasonable' interpretations of law exists. In the case of administrative agencies with
internal hierarchies and nationwide jurisdiction, of course, this 'chaos' problem is not
present. But in a bankruptcy system relying upon hundreds of co-ordinate and
decentralized adjudicators resolving cases, a large dose of uncertainty is unavoidable,
and chaos [is] a plausible outcome.
/d. (emphasis added).
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These commentators are, I suggest, victims of the pyramid story. Variation
in doctrinal content, which is in fact endemic and quotidian, gets framed into
being a problem. In this view, variation is either a passing thing or a pathology.
Where variation is a passing thing, it is considered to be only temporary the
hierarchical mechanics merely has not yet ·gotten around to consolidating a bit of
doctrine. Where variation is a pathology, it is understood as a sort of exception,
telling us nothing about the normal functioning of a legal system in the same way
that a cancer tells us nothing about the normal functioning of the body. In either
case, variation is idealized away. The pyramid story thus interprets variation by
defining away its centrality in the everyday life of a legal system.

2. Centering variation: indeterminacy and what follows
Against the instinct to idealize away variation, there runs an opposite
tendency. This tendency, associated with the Legal Realists and Critical Legal
Studies, gives variation a central role.
An important trilogy of articles by Karl Llewellyn, Stewart Macaulay, and
Duncan Kennedy demonstrates the ways in which variation can be taken
seriously. In 1950, Llewellyn claimed that "[i]n the work of a single opinion-day
I have observed 26 different, describable ways in which one of our best state
courts handled its own prior cases, repeatedly using three to six different ways
53
within a single opinion." In a classic statement of the Legal Realist position,
Llewellyn continues:
What is important is that all 26 ways (plus a dozen others which
happened not to be in use that day) are correct. They represent not
"evasion," but sound use, application and development of precedent.
They represent not "departure from," but sound continuation of, our
system of precedent as it has come down to us. The major defect in that
system is a mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it to wit,
the idea that the cases themselves and in themselves, plus the correct
rules on how to handle cases, provide one single correct answer to a
disputed issue of law. In fact the available correct answers are two,
three, or ten. The question is: Which of the available correct answers
will the court select and why? For since there is always more than one
4
available correct answer, the court always has to select. 5

53

Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
about How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 396 (1950).
54
/d. Note that Llewellyn's fonnulation is expressly empirical rather than ideological: our
system of precedent is what it is; "[t]he major defect in that system is a mistaken idea which many
lawyers have about it." !d. (emphasis added).
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In a characteristically delightful exercise, Llewellyn (taking cases on statutory
construction as an example) then detailed twenty-eight positions announced by
courts. Side-by-side with these, Llewellyn presented their twenty-eight opposites,
5
also announced by courts. 5 Where some see incoherence, Llewellyn sees only a
·
complex system at work.
In an article sixteen years later, Macaulay observed substantial variation in
56
the way courts construed a set of contracts cases. Unlike Llewellyn however,
Macaulay did more than observe that the body of doctrine was variable. He also
devised a sense-making scheme (based on policy objectives and implementation
mechanisms imputed to judges) which he superimposed upon the data in an
7
attempt resolve the apparent variation into some sort of system. 5
Ten years after the Macaulay article, Kennedy walked the same road. After
observing variation generally across contract law cases, Kennedy proposed a
different, now very familiar, sense-making scheme:
If the judges had neither derived the common law rules from the
concepts nor applied them mechanically to the facts, then what had they
been doing? ... [T]hey had been legislating and then enforcing their
economic biases. The legal order represented not a coherent
individualist philosophy, but concrete individualist economic interests
58
dressed up in gibberish.
Like Macaulay, Kennedy superimposed a scheme to systematize the observed
9
60
variation. 5 But then Kennedy went on to deplore the scheme he superimposed.
In these three important works, I want to point out one distinction and one
continuity. The distinction lies in the authors' choice of whether to superimpose
a sense-making scheme upon the variable content of doctrine. Macaulay and
Kennedy elect for superimposition, and Llewellyn does not. It is interesting that
Llewellyn offers no explanation for the variation he observes. He makes no
attempt to make doctrinal contradiction seem to make sense. He seems frankly
unconcerned that contradiction exists at all, and even slightly amused by those
who are troubled. If Llewellyn offers an interpretation, it is not at the level of the

55

/d. at 401-06.
56
Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read Business Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051 ( 1966).
5
7/d. at I 056-57 (offering categories of rules and standards, and identifying market goals and
"other than market" goals).
58
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1749 ( 1976).
59
/d. at 1762-66 (applying individualistic and altruistic model as basis to explain
observations).
60
/d. at 1774-76.
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legal system's content (e.g., "when you consider my sense-making scheme, which
elaborates the micro-rationalities of particular adjudicators, what appeared to be
variable and contradictory now seems systematic, albeit deplorable") but rather
at the level of the legal system's dynamics. Content variation, on Llewellyn's
61
view, is ~veryday grist for the mill of a working complex legal system.
For the moment, however, I am more interested in how the LlewellynMacaulay-Kennedy trilogy is continuous: they all treat variation as a fundamental
attribute of legal systems. It is this recognition of the centrality of variation that
distinguishes the Realist and Critical perspective from the tradition of doctrinal
62
legal scholarship that preceded legal realism.
What I am calling variation in doctrinal content, the Critical scholars define
64
63
as "indeterminacy"
and "contradiction. "
The Crits' recognition of
indeternlinacy is grounded in a metaphysical claim and proceeds toward a
pragmatic program. The metaphysical claim is that reality is socially
65
constructed. The pragmatic program recommends that we tum our attention
away from the bootless divining of laws or patterns, and focus instead on policy

.

61

For what it is worth, this Article follows Llewellyn. I observe content variation, but offer
no micro-rational sense-making scheme. Instead, I am interested in content-level variation in order
to explore legal systems at the macro-level of structure and dynamics. See infra Part V.B.
62
See David M. Trubek & John Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies:
Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box?, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 3, 9 (1989) [hereinafter Trubek &
Esser, Critical Empiricism] (stating Legal Realists "showed that legal doctrine was indetern1inant
and contradictory, thus demonstrating that doctrinal considerations could not explain legal
outcomes. The Realists' 'discovery' of the indetenninacy of legal doctrine posed a threat to
mainstream themes of legal autonomy, neutrality, and rationality, as well as to the bases for
scholarly authority.'').
63
See DavidM. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 575, 578 (1984) [hereinafter Trubek, Where the Action Is] (stating that critics assert
"doctrine neither provides a determinant answer to questions nor covers all conceivable situations.
This is the principle of indeterminacy.")
64
See id. Trubek states that:
[T]he critics reject the view that the doctrine contains a single, coherent, and justifiable
view of human relations; rather, they see the doctrine as reflecting two or even more
different and often competing views, no one of which is either coherent or pervasive
enough to be called dominant. This is the principle of contradiction.
I d.
65
See id. at 609 ("[T]here is no real world which is mirrored ... in legal ideas. Ideas and
economic or social structures are mutually constituting. Law creates society and society creates law;
the relationships are complex and multidirectional. The resulting systems of action and order must
be seen as a totality."). For a foundational text regarding the "social construction" thesis, see PETER
L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY ( 1966). See generally
Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAw & Soc 'y REV. 1243,
1248 (1994) (noting that legal thought creates fiction by transfonning the fluid and contested into
"static and fixed").
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67

studies and the praxis of transforrnative politics. A passage from Robert
Gordon's statement of the theoretical underpinnings of Critical Legal Studies is
instructive:
Positivist social scientists (who would include both liberal and Marxist
"instrumentalist" legal theorists) are always trying to find out how
social reality objectively works, the secret laws that govern its action;
they ask such questions as, "Under what economic conditions is one
likely to obtain formal legal rules?" Anti-positivists assert that such
questions are meaningless, since what we experience as "social reality"
is something that we are constantly constructing; and that this is just as
68
true for "economic conditions" as it is for "legal rules."
· Note the two steps in the Critical position: (1) Crits interpret variation in doctrinal
content as evidence of the claim that social reality is always in the process of
being constructed, and (2) Crits conclude that there are no laws that govern that
69
process of social construction.
This Article accepts the first step and rejects the second: reality is
70
constructed, but the process of that construction is observable and describable.
We can make statements about the social construction process, and those
statements can be more or less right or wrong. I want to suggest that the process
of social construction by which a legal system is constantly being made, un-made,
and re-made does in fact exhibit observable patterns patterns about which we

66

See William H. Clune III, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the
Model for Public Policy, Research, and the Changing Roles ofLaw and Lawyers, 69 lowA L. REv.
47,103 n.l52 (1983).
67
Trubek & Esser, Critical Empiricism, supra note 62, at 45 (calling for "politically selfconscious practice of knowledge construction").
68
Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 281, 287
(David Kairys ed., 1982).
6
~ote that Crits do observe some patterns in the social construction process, e.g., biases of
individual decision makers on questions of class or race. In the vernacular of this Article, such
biases are forms that enter the relevant system, and perhaps rise to the level of norms. The tendency
to class bias is a form (and perhaps a norm) in precisely the same way as a discounted cash flow
model. See infra Part V.A.2.(b ). My position is that social science can measure, and falsify
hypotheses regarding, such fonns.
70
There is a parallel to the position that "social reality is socially constructed." See generally
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KlND OF SCIENCE 1-16 (2002) (supporting proposition that the universe
is computational, i.e., physical reality is physically constructed). Wolfram makes a substantial, even
stunning, contribution to the reality is constructed thesis by suggesting the equivalence of all
universal computing systems: e.g., the complex physical phenomenon being observed (e.g., a
waterfall) is as complex as the researcher observing it. Object and subject are equally complex and
mutually influential, and this is true even at the level ofphysics. /d.
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can hypothesize and which hypotheses we can test and refine. Thus, my position
differs substantially from the Critical position. Crits treat indetertninacy as the end
of one inquiry ("What is a legal system? Nothing more than the execution of the
biases of the most powerful actors.") and the beginning of another ("If that is all
there is to a legal system, then let us turn our attention to policy studies and
transformative politics."). I regard indeterrninacy as contributing substantial
information and direction to the principal inquiry: What is a legal system? Can we
specify its dynamics?

3. A different direction: variation and emergence
Suppose we take indeterminacy and contradiction, not as the end of the
72
analysis, but rather as the beginning. Instead of asking, "What does variation tell

71

It does not follow that, if one accepts the premise that reality is socially constructed, one
must reject the possibility that stable, describable, and knowable patterns characterize the process
of construction. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Scholars, Judges, and Phenomenology: Comments on
Tamanaha's Realistic Sociolegal Theory, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 241, 242 (2000) (proclaiming himself
"entirely persuaded by the Continental critique of positivism" and then going on to restate a theory
of adjudication that draws from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology). The fonnulation
provided by Trubek and Esser is helpful here. See Trubek & Esser, Critical Empiricism, supra note
62, at II. Trubek and Esser define "universal scientism" (sometimes also called "positivism") as
"an understanding of the nature of knowledge and its construction. It presupposes a radical
distinction between an external world of objects and behaviors and an internal world of
consciousness." /d. Trubek and Esser define "detenninism" as "an understanding of the social
world. It suggests that social action is governed by laws, much like the laws that govern the rotation
of the planets. These laws exist irrespective of our wills and provide social action with a deep
logic." /d. Since I argue that there is a measurable and definable relationship between variation and
ordering, my position ( 1) joins the Critical position in rejecting universal scientism 's split between
object and subject I accept the claim that social reality is constructed; however, my argument (2)
does not join the Crits' rejection of determinism. Socially constructed phenomena can exhibit
observable patterns (although these patterns, by definition, do not exist "irrespective of our wills,"
and are probably rather unlike "the laws that govern the rotation of the planets"). See id. While we
cannot predict the future content of a legal system, we can describe the dynamics and structures that
generate that content. Indeed, it is a hallmark feature of self-organizing criticality that we can
describe the structure that produces the content, but we cannot predict the content. See, e.g., J.C.
Sprott et al., Self-Organized Criticality in Forest-Landscape Evolution, 297 PHYSICS LETTERS 267,
267 (2002) (describing self-organized criticality emergence in simple models).
72
Speaking for the school of"autopoiesis," Gunther Teubner has written in a similar vein:
While postmodemists are obviously satisfied to deconstruct legal doctrine and are
joyfully playing with antinomies and paradoxes, legal autopoiesis poses the somewhat
sobering question: After the deconstruction?
Creative use of paradox is the message that moves autopoiesis beyond
deconstructive analysis into reconstructive practice. It is the experience of real life, the
experience that discursive practices "know" how to overcome the blockage of
paradoxes and antinomies that does not allow autopoiesis theory to remain in the
comforting twilight . . . . Paradoxes, tautologies, contradictions, and ambiguities in
discursive practice are not the end of autopoietic analysis; they are seen as the starting
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us about the content of a legal system?" let us ask, "What does variation tell us
about legal systems' structure and dynamics?" How can a system characterized
73
by variation be understood as a system at all? I want to suggest that content
variation is a precondition for a dynamical process of emergence, in which legal
systems develop and disseminate new features in a self-organizing process.
In a classic study of the self-organizing of bureaucracies published in 1955,
Peter Blau summarized his findings:
In his analysis of bureaucratic structure, Weber focused upon official
regulations and requirements and their significance for administrative
efficiency. Of course, he knew that the behavior of members of an
organization does not precisely correspond to its blueprint. But he was
not concerned with this problem and did not investigate systematically
the way in which operations actually are carried out. Consequently, his
analysis ignored the fact that, in the course of operations, new elements
arise in the structure which influence subsequent operations. Recent
students of organization hav-e emp,h asized the importance of these
emergent factors, such as informal relationships or unofficial norms ....
. . ~ Most discussions on the subject contrast informal relationships
and practices with the formal blueprint of the organization. This
emphasizes the least interesting aspect of the concept of "informal
organization,"namely, that behavior and relationships often fail to
conform exactly to formal prescriptions, which is certainly not a novel
discovery. Much more significant is the insight that such a~tivities and
interactions are not simply idiosyncratic deviations but form consistent
patterns that are new elements of the organization .... [O]rganizations
do not statically remain as they had been conceived but always develop
74
into new fortns of organization.
Indetenninacy in doctrine and gaps between the blueprint and the reality are not
just negative findings: things are up for grabs; you never can tell; "it's conflict all
75
the way down." Rather, variation, be it indeterminacy, contradiction, paradox,

point, as the very foundation of self-organizing social practices.
Gunther Teubner, The TwoFacesofJanus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZOL.REv.l443,
1444 45 (1992).
73
David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society
Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1990) (describing "systemicity").
74
PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY 2 ( 1955). See also CHESTER I.
BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 114-22 (15th prtg. 1962) (discussing informal
organizations).
75
See Richard Michael Fischl, It's Conflict All the Way Down, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 773, 780
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or gap, is actually the beginning of a constructive finding: these indeterminacies
and gaps contribute to the emergence of"consistent patterns that are new elements
76
of the organization." Thus the insight of self-organization: alongside the static
order rationally ordained (in the bankruptcy example, this is the pyramid story of
appellate control and consolidation of doctrine), there is an order that is always
emerging dynamically. Any accurate description of a legal system should account
for both orders~

B. Structure in the Storm: Local Legal Cultures
Variation in legal systems is normal and common. This observation turns on
its head the claim (implicit in the pyramid story) that variation is aritithetical to the
very definition of a legal system. To the contrary, a legal system as lived and
experienced will live and experience variation.
Yet it is not enough to say merely that variation is common. Variation is
more than just a feature of legal systems; it is a structural feature. Variation is not
noise in the system random, unpattemable, emitting scattered signals that
ultimately cancel out each other. Rather, variation in a legal system's content is
architectural it is generative of order.
To take a closer look at the structural characteristics of variation, we begin
by reviewing important empirical research, both in and beyond bankruptcy, on
local legal cultures.

76

BLAU, supra note 74, at 2.

The field of''sociolinguistics" provides substantial direction and
methodology to our study of the relationship between variable content and emergent norn1s. See,
e.g., Uriel Weinrich etal.,EmpiricalFoundationsfora TheoryofLanguage Change, in DIRECTIONS
FOR HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS: A SYMPOSIUM 95, 10~01 (W.P. Lehmann & Yakov Malkiel eds.,
1968). The authors note that:
The facts of heterogeneity have not so far jibed well with the structural approach to
language.... For the more linguists became impressed with the existence of structure
of language, and the more they bolstered this observation with deductive arguments
about the functional advantages of structure, the more mysterious became the transition
of a language from state to state. After all, if a language has to be structured in order to
function efficiently, how do people continue to talk while the language changes, that
is, while it passes through periods of lessened systematicity? ... The solution, we will
argue, lies in the direction of breaking down the identification of structuredness with
homogeneity. The key to a rational conception of language change indeed, of
language itself is the possibility of describing orderly differentiation in a language
serving a community .... One of the corollaries of our approach is that in a language
serving a complex (i.e., real) community, it is absence of structured heterogeneity that
would be dysfunctional
/d. (first emphasis added). As in language, the task of law should be to "break(] down the
identification ofstructuredness with homogeneity" and instead discern the strocture in the variation,
and state the relationship between that structure and the dynamics ofordering. /d. See also Galanter,
Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 258 (looking to linguistic models for methodology useful to legal
studies).
•
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1. Local legal cultures in bankruptcy
.

.

Empirical research on bankruptcy begins by observing substantial variation
77
in the application of bankruptcy laws. But the empirical work goes beyond
merely observing the fact of variation: the research also establishes that this
78
variation takes the form of substantial and persistent patterns. These patterns can
79
80
be organized geographically or non-geographically. Where the doctrinal
literature contends that variation signifies a legal system that is fundamentally
81
incoherent and at odds with itself, the empirical research reveals something very
different: the U.S. bankruptcy system is made up of many communities that are,
in themselves, internally coherent and unified. The_se communities order and
82
consolidate doctrine on a /ocailevel. The empirical work uses the tertn "local
legal cultures'' to describe this organizational feature of variation. As defined by
Professors Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L., Westbrook, local
legal cultures are

77

See infra text accompanying notes 82---85 (discussing empirical works). A devotee of the
pyramid story would note that this variation blatantly defies the unifonn federal Bankruptcy Code
and even goes so far as to violate the spirit ofa clause in the U.S. Constitution expressly authorizing
Congress to "establish ... unifonn Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
78
See, e.g., LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 43, at 1502 (presenting "evidence
of persistent, systematic differences in legal outcomes between communities governed by the same
written law").
79
See, e.g., Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 829 (using Western District of
Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) and Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) as examples of
percentage of Chapter 13 cases that are filed). See also TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 343 ( 1989) (noting that
best level of analysis for bankruptcy variation is federal district rather than state). Federal districts
may be better than states as levels of analysis because bankruptcy trial networks are organized
district-by-district (and really, judge-by-judge). See infra Part V.A.l (discussing bankruptcy trial
networks).
80
See infra note 93 (discussing Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization ofLarge~. Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 125 ( 1990) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining]).
81
See supra Part III.A.l (discussing mainstream scholarly approaches to variation).
82
The term local does not necessarily correlate with geography. Actors share a local legal
culture when they are networked with each other when they share a substantial amount of
connections. See generally ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS
passim (2002) (detailing various links); MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE
GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 197 (2002) (noting that uthere can be no more than a few
links separating any two individuals"). Networks can be defined by geography (e.g., folks in the
Western District ofWisconsin form a practice community thatdiffers substantially from the practice
community fonned in the Eastern District of Wisconsin) or by some non-geographical variable,
such as status, see infra note 93 (describing non-geographic networks in LoPucki and Whitford
study of variation in distributions by Chapter 11 plans).

No.2]

SELF-ORGANIZING LEGAL SYSTEMS

511

systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a
consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared by
many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in
identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and expectations
existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal legal
83
regime.
These patterns of local ordering are remarkably robust, lasting over twenty years
and weathering every sort of economic swing and several legislative adjustments
84
to the Bankruptcy Code.
Two examples of local legal cultures, one drawn from the consumer
hemisphere of bankruptcy and one from the business hemisphere, provide a taste
85
of the insight.

(a) Repaymentfloors in Chapter 13 plans
In the consumer hemisphere of bankruptcy, Professor Jean Braucher studied
Chapter 13 plans routinely confirmed in bankruptcy jurisdictions in four
86
metropolitan areas. Chapter 13 is a bankruptcy provision whereby a consumer
debtor writes a plan that, among other things, may allow her to repay only a
percentage of her original debt to some of her creditors. This plan is typically
submitted to a Chapter 13 trustee who can play a substantial role in revising the
plan. Ultimately, the plan must be confirtned by the judge of the local bankruptcy
court. Braucher found that "repayment floors," i.e., minimum repayment
percentages routinely accepted by trustees and confirmed by judges (and hence,
routinely offered by local bankruptcy practitioners), had emerged along
87
geographical pattems. For example, Braucher found that plans proposing to
repay a mere ten percent of debt were routinely confirmed in Dayton, Ohio, while
plans in San Antonio, Texas, needed to propose a hundred percent repayment in
88
order to be routinely confirmed.

83

Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 804.
84
See id. at 858 (noting that "the differences suggested by the data are large enough and
persistent enough to suggest systematic, community differences that survive the tenure of a single
actor or group of actors"); Whitford, supra note 43, at 407-09. ·
85
More examples of local legal strategies, usages, and nonns are collected infra Part V .A.2.
See also LoPucki, Law in Lawyers ' Heads, supra note 43, at 1506-07 (noting variation in routinely
passed floor levels in four U.S. cities).
86
Braucher, supra note 43 , at 532.
87/d.
88/d.
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(b) Distributions to old equity in Chapter 11 plans

In the business hemisphere of bankruptcy, Professors Lynn M. LoPucki and
William C. Whitford studied the conduct of Chapter 11 reorganizations of the
89
largest publicly held corporations over several years. Chapter 11 plans, like their
consumer counterpart, allow the debtor-corporation to write a plan that
restructures debt and proposes a post-reorganization distribution of value.
LoPucki and Whitford found that plans negotiated among the debtor-corporation
and the various claimants against the firm very often included some distribution
of value to the shareholders of the debtor-corporation prior to reorganization
90
(these pre-bankruptcy shareholders are known as "old equity"). These
distributions routinely occurred despite a legal provision entitling creditors to
absolute priority over old equity. This legal entitlement is clear and, according to
91
LoPucki and Whitford, could be easily and cheaply enforced. And yet creditors,
against their apparent self-interest, routinely agreed to a distribution of value to
92
old equity. LoPucki and Whitford conclude that the lawyers who negotiate the
plans in big business bankruptcies are nearly all members of the same practice
conununity (i.e., big city, mega-firtn lawyers), and that a convention of
93
distribution to old equity had emerged within this community.
2. Local legal cultures beyond bankruptcy

Long before empirical research by lawyers began sketching the outlines of
bankruptcy's local legal cultures, social scientists researching legal systems had
already made much use of the concept. An important early work suggesting the
existence of local legal cultures was Herbert Jacob's Debtors in Court, published
94
in 1969. Jacob surveyed creditors' debt collection practices and consumer
debtors' bankruptcy filing rates in four Wisconsin cities. All four cities applied
89

LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining, supra note 80, at 134-3 7.
90
/d. at 143.
91
/d. at 144.
92/d.
93
!d. at 156-58. The 1990 findings (i.e., that there is substantial distribution to old equity)
were supported in a more recent study of Chapter 11 bankruptcies from 1991 through 1996. See
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Myth ofthe Residual Owner: An Empirical Study, UCLA School of Law,
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 3-11, at http://ssm.com/abstract=401160 (Apr. 29, 2003). It
should be noted that distributions to old equity are certainly not prohibited by the Code, and were
even explicitly envisioned by Congress. Nevertheless, the text of the statute does not compel, and
the self-interest of creditors argues against, such distributions. The fact that big bankruptcy plans
have developed singular characteristics suggests the existence of a legal culture that is hinged, not
on geography, but on a sort of class or status: a community of interpretation and mutual-influence
has emerged among the bankruptcy practitioners of large and prestigious law firms, whether those
finns be in New York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco, or Los Angeles.
94
See HERBERT JACOB, DEBTORS IN COURT 87-96 (1969).
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the same formal law (i.e., Wisconsin debt collection law and federal bankruptcy
95
law). Yet Jacob's data showed both (1) substantial variation in the frequency of
legal action (i.e., how often a creditor garnished a debtor's wages; how often a
debtor sought bankruptcy protection); and (2) clear patterns in the variation
demonstrating a significant correlation between parties' use of remedies and the
96
city in which the action took place. A year later, Richard J. Richardson and
Kenneth N. Vines published a book in which they coined the tertn ''legal
subculture" to explain the relationship between local political cultures and judicial
97
recruitment to federal district courts. During the ensuing thirty years, a steady
stream of social science research explored the usefulness of the local legal
cultures explanation for various phenomena observed in civil and criminal _legal
98
systems.
A 1978 report on court delay written by Thomas Church and his colleagues
offers an early definition of "local legal cultures":
•

95

/d. at 88.
96
/d. at 89-91.
91
See RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS:
LOWER COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 passim ( 1970).
98
See THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., EXAMINING LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE: PRACTITIONER
ATTITUDES IN FOUR CRIMINAL COURTS 52 ( 1982) [hereinafter CHURCH, LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE]
(discussing felony criminal dispositions in four cities); THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., ET AL., JUSTICE
DELA YEO: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 54 ( 1978) (coining term "local legal
culture'~ in study of pace of civil and criminal litigation in twenty-one urban courts); JAMES
EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL
COURTS 65-168 (University Press of America, Inc. 1991) (describing criminal felony dispositions
in three cities); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 1--4 (1978) (noting newly recruited judges and attorneys adapt
to extant nonns); JACOB, supra note 94, at 87-96 (describing inter-city variation in garnishments
and bankruptcies); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE: REFORM IMPACT IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTS 27-29 (1978) (detailing local variation in criminal courts); RICHARDSON &
VINES, supra note 97, at 56-79 (noting connection between judicial recruitment and local political
culture); Thomas W. Church, Plea Bargaining and Local Legal Culture, in CONTEMPLATING
COURTS, 132, 138-39 (Lee Epstein ed. 1995) [hereinafter Church, Plea Bargaining] (discussing
plea bargaining in four urban criminal courts); James L . Gibson, Environmental Constraints on the
Behavior ofJudges: A Representational Model ofJudicial Decision Making, 14 LAw & Soc'y REv.
343, 343--44 (1980) (discussing judges' role orientations); James L. Gibson, Judges' Role
Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 911, 914-15
(1978) (describing judges' role orientations); Joel B. Grossman et al., Measuring the Pace ofCivil
Litigation in Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 112 (1981) (discussing rate of
processing civil litigation); Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and
the Control of Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'y REV. 535, 537- 39 (1993) (describing Rule 11
application in federal district courts); Raymond T. Nimmer, A Slightly Moveable Object: A Case
Study in Judicial Reform in the Criminal Justice Process The Onmibus Hearing, 48 DENVER L.J.
179, 187 ( 1971) (describing "local discretionary systems" in application of criminal plea
bargaining).
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It is our conclusion that the speed of disposition of civil and criminal
litigation in a court cannot be ascribed in any simple sense to the length
of its backlog, any more than it can be explained by court size, caseload,
or trial rate. Rather, both quantitative and qualitative data generated in
this research strongly suggest that both speed and backlog are
determined in large part by established expectations, practices, and
informal rules of behavior of judges and attorneys. For want of a better
tertn, we have called this cluster of related factors the "local legal
99
culture. "
This.. definition, like the definition of "local legal cultures" offered in the
100
bankruptcy literature, focuses on the norms (including expectations, usages,
perceptions, etc.) of network actors (including judges, practitioners, clients, etc.).
I want to draw two points from the stream of social science research on local
legal cultures. The first regards the construction ofsocial reality associated with
101
Critical Legal Studies and other traditions. Church, in the 1978 passage just
quoted, regards the objective factors surrounding delay (e.g., court size, caseload,
trial rate) as conceptually subsequent to subjective factors (i.e., the expectations
102
of the relevant actors). Other research suggests that the objective factors are
103
conceptually prior to subjective factors. Church, in a 1995 writing, elaborates
on this "chicken-and-egg" problem:
[D]oes local legal culture cause or at least influence a court's output and
its practitioner's behavior? Or does cause and effect work the other way
around? Are existing patterns of output and behavior simply
internalized by new judges and lawyers when they "learn the ropes" in
a court, and thereby unconsciously turned into nortns of behavior?
Unfortunately, even if we establish a demonstrable relationship between
actual court output and the norms of practitioners working in that court,
it would not be possible to detertnine which of these two alternative

99

CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELA YEO, supra note 98, at 54. See also Church, Plea Bargaining,

supra note 98, at 136-37. Church states that:
Indeed, when lawyers are called on to represent a client in an unfamiliar court, they
often report that their biggest problems occur ,in areas of court operation that cannot be
uncovered by reading statutes or local court rules or by looking at case files. Lawyers
refer to these variations in norms and ways of doing things as differences in 'local
practice.' Social scientists frequently use the term local/ega/ culture to describe this
network of unwritten standards and patterns of behavior.
/d.
100
See Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 804.
101
See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
102
See CHURCH ET AL., JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 98, at 54.
103
Notably, Herbert Kritzer's Rule 11 study. See Kritzer & Zemans, supra note 98, at 539.
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hypotheses is correct. The best that social science can usually provide
is evidence of a relationship between two variables in this case,
between practitioner notms and court system behavior. Detertnining
which variable is the causal factor and which is what social scientists
104
call the dependent variable is often a speculative exercise.
If the social construction thesis is correct, however, it is unnecessary to show that
either objective or subjective factors are conceptually prior or causal subjective
105
and objective factors mutually constitute each other.
A second contribution of the social science literature is to help refine the
definition of local legal cultures. It is the beginning of definition to say that local
legal cultures involve the norms ofnetwork actors. But what are norms and what
are networks? Let us clarify the meaning of these two key terms.

C. Forms, Norms, and Networks
It is useful to draw a distinction between norms andforms. In any given
system, a form is just a particular way of doing things. Fortns in a legal system
include at least the variety of lawyers' strategies, administrative routines, and
judicial utterances. Broadly speaking, forms are everything that makes up the
content of a system.
A norm, on the other hand, is a particular forrn that has come to characterize
system content. A norm is a way of doing things that has achieved a level of
106
popularity or pervasiveness such that it has come to be expected.

104

Church, Plea Bargaining, supra note 98, at 137.
105
See id. ("It is entirely possible for causality to work in both directions: nonns can influence
behavior, which in tum can influence nonns. The hypothesis suggested here is simply that
practitioner notms regarding the proper mode of disposition of criminal cases are related to actual
dispositional patterns in criminal trial courts."). See generally ARTHUR F. McEvoY, THE
FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980 (1986);
Hendrik Hartog, The End(s) ofCritical Empiricism, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 53, 58 (1989) (asserting,
for the purposes of argument, the "irrelevance of method").
106
1t may be useful to illustrate the difference between fonns and nonns by using simple
algebraic notation. Let us define variable system content as:
_

(J
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J.l ' J.l ' J.l. ' jJ ' J.l ' J.l ' J.l ' J..l ' /J ' jJ ' · · • J.l

where u stands for variation, Ec stands for system content, and each jJ represents a different
particular fonn. For example the p's in the above statement could represent the variety of ways that
a judge could assign value to a car, with p,' being "look it up in the bluebook," 1-l being "evidence
from a local appraiser," p 3 being "owner testimony" and so forth. Let us define ordered system
content as:
"'

_

I

'P Cc - jJ '

I

1

I

2

I

1

1

I

I

jJ 'jJ ' f.J ' jJ ' /J ' /J 'jJ ' f.J ' J..l ' • • · jJ

1

where l/J represents a norm of the system's content. In this latter statement we see that J.l (look it
up in the bluebook) has come to characterize the system. While there is still the occasionaltl
(evidence from local appraiser), we can say that the system has come to expect bluebook evidence
1
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107

Networks can be a slippery concept. The social science literature on local
legal cultures has set forth at least two rival conceptions of networks; each is
discussed below.
1. Networks as Hworkgroups"
In 1977, James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob published their study of
108
criminal felony dispositions in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit. The authors
found that where the same judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorney
worked together on multiple cases, plea bargains increased and cases were
109
disposed more quickly. Where the membership of the workgroup (i.e., judge,
prosecutor, defense attorney) was unstable, there were fewer plea bargains and a
110
slower disposition rate. Eisenstein and Jacob conclude: "Familiarity produced
111
pleas, because with familiarity negotiations reduced uncertainty."
A workgroup, as used by Eisenstein and Jacob, is a set of system actors that
112
are strongly tied to each other
that is, a workgroup is comprised of actors who
are common participants in repeated transactions. The question is whether a
network, properly defined, should be limited to the strongly tied actors of a
workgroup, or whether a network includes workgroups plus something more.
Undoubtedly, strongly tied actors establish communicative norms. We
observe, for example, that frequent conversation partners develop a special slang,
and autistic twins develop their own language. But, while a strong-ties-workgroup
definition of networks seems accurate, it also seems underinclusive. The problem
with limiting the definition of networks to strong-ties groups is the suggestion of
autonomy: if networks were no more than isolated workgroups, operating side-byside as separate and sealed systems, then communication between networks would
be. much more difficult than it is. Each workgroup would comprise its own
system, and the ordering of that system's content would be autonomous, with no

(i.e., bluebook evidence is the norn1). So a norm is nothing more than a particular form that has
come to characterize a system. More generally, we can say that the project of this Article is to state
the relationship between variable system content (a Ec) and ordered system content(¢ Ec).
107
See infra Part IV.C.l for my attempt to refine the definition of network.
108
EISENSTEIN & JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE, supra note 98, at 67- 178.
109
/d. at 244-51.
110/d.
111
Jd. at 252.
112
See generally Mark S. Granovettor, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. OF Soc. 1360,
1360, 1362-63 (1973) [hereinafter Granovettor, Strength of Weak Ties] (arguing that "the degree
of overlap of two individuals' friendship networks varies directly with the strength of their tie to
one another"); MarkS. Granovettor, The Strength ofWeak Ties: A Network Theory Revis ted, 1 Soc.
THEORY 201,202 (1983) [hereinafter Granovettor, Weak Ties Revisited] (noting "that social systems
lacking in weak ties will be fragmented and incoherent").

'
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possibility for inter-workgroup ordering. A broader definition of networks seems
necessary.

2. Networks as semi-autonomous

•

Church, in a 1982 study of criminal court practices in Pittsburgh, Miami,
Detroit, and the Bronx, explicitly challenged the workgroup hypothesis presented
113
by Eisenstein and Jacob. The workgroup hypothesis suggests that where
workgroup stability is high, the trial rate will be low because the familiarity of the
parties with one another will facilitate disposition by plea bargaining; similarly,
where workgroup stability is low, the hypothesis suggests that the parties' lack of
familiarity with each other will impede plea bargaining and result in more full
114
trials. Contrary to the workgroup hypothesis, however, Church's data showed
that the
court with consistently the lowest proportion of trials ... [the Bronx]
affords very little opportunity for the growth of stable relationships
among judge, [assistant district attorney], and defense attorney. The one
court with unambiguously strong workgroup cohesion Miami's felony
court consistently ranks at or near the top in the proportion of cases
disposed by triaL The relationships among the courts are thus almost the
opposite of what the courtroom workgroup hypothesis would
suggest . . . .
.
[T]hese observations ... suggest that dispositional practices in a
court system may be grounded in something more fundamental and
permanent than the current assignment practices and management
115
procedures of courts, district attorneys, and public defenders.
Forms and norms, it seems, develop not only within workgroups, but also across
116
workgroups.
So the proper definition of network should represent an
overlapping and semi-autonomous arrangement of multiple workgroups. Church,
writing in 1995, suggests that "[o ]ne corollary of the legal culture hypothesis is
the expectation of finding general agreement both within and across classes of
practitioners in a given court. In other words, the notion of legal culture implies

113

CHURCH, LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE, supra note

114

98, at 48- 52.

/d. at 48-49.
115
/d. at 52.
11 6
Put another way, the situs for ordered system content can be either intra-network or internetwork. Much of the local/ega/ cultures research in bankruptcy may be evidence of intra-network
ordering (i.e., "that's the way we do things here in the Western District of Wisconsin"), but self•
organization also involves nornts that spread, via weak ties, from network to network. See infra Part
V .A.2.(b) (examples of inter-network organizing).
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shared norn1s within a jurisdiction, not simply differences across courts."
Properly understood, a network includes strong-ties workgroups, but also
transcends them.
D. From Variation to Ordering

Local legal cultures constitute evidence of non-hierarchical ordering. Legal
fonns, which would otherwise be variable, are systematized in a particular
locality. We can thus conclude that at least some significant portion of the
variation we observe is not random noise. Rather, there are patterns to the
variation, and these patterns are stable, knowable, and navigable. This
contribution of the local legal cultures research is quite significant: alongside
hierarchical mechanisms, we also find means of self-organization that produce
118
emergent patterns.
But while local legal cultures show us the existence of non-hierarchical
ordering, they do not show us how that ordering occurs. Local legal culture is an
119
observation, not an explanation.
We thus return to the fundamental question: "What orders system content
when hierarchy does not?" The example of bankruptcy has shown us a legal
•

117

Church, Plea Bargaining, supra note 98, at 146.
118
Important work in the bankruptcy area by LoPucki substantially develops this informal and
emergent model of legal ordering. LoPucki suggests that local practice communities construct
"shared mental models" that serve as reservoirs of system content, and these models prove resilient,
even to changes in the forn1al written law. See LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 43, at
1501--02. LoPucki states that:
Within [small practice] communities, the law in lawyers' heads plays a dominant role.
A shared mental model of law implicitly proclaims ''this is how we do things" (or, if
the conversation should skip to a higher plane, "this is the right thing to do") .... In
these communities, the shared mental model is primary law, and the written law merely
background with which the model interacts.
/d. LoPucki then applies an economic model developed by economists Arthur T. Denzau and
Douglas C. North as an alternative to the conventional substantive rationality optimization model.
See Arthur T. Denzau & Douglas C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47
KYKLOS 3, 18- 20 ( 1994). LoPucki 's analysis thus begins the process of specifying the dynamics
of legal ordering. We can now say, following LoPucki, Denzau, and North, that the dynamics of
legal ordering involves the process of developing and communicating shared mental models on the
local level, i.e., systemdynamicsofchangeinvolves speakers' norms. This is an important advance.
Yet we are still interested in how those models or expectations (forms, in the vernacular of this
Article) are developed and communicated.
119
See Grossman et al., supra note 98, at 112. The authors state that:
'local legal culture' is not an explanation as much as it is a convenient restatement of
the problem. It merely applies a label to what is generally accepted: that the practices
and attitudes toward court processiqg of attorneys and court personnal [sic] play a
significant role in determining the pace of litigation in a particular court.
!d.
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system that, despite substantial defects in hierarchical mechanics, continues to
manifest ordering via multiple local legal cultures. There seems to be
substantially more ordering in the bankruptcy system than one would have a right
to expect if the pyramid story alone was true. The fortnal mechanisms of
hierarchy, which occupy the center stage of the legal imagination, explain some
120
legal ordering, but not all. Hierarchy reigns, but does not rule.
We can distill two features of local legal cultures: first, a structure of
overlapping networks local legal cultures overlap in such a way that they are
experienced, not as several sealed and separate systems operating side-by-side,
but rather as a single and unified (but not uniform) whole. So we can say that the
practice of bankruptcy law, like the practice of speaking English in the United
States, exhibits nationwide conununicative unity with stark regional accents.
Second, a dynamics of form innovation and norm emergence: local legal cultures
generate forms and norms, which constitute a given local legal culture as both
coherent in itself and distinct from other local legal cultures.
These two features, structure and dynamics, frame our attempt to explain the
process of non-hierarchical ordering.

IV.

SELF-ORGANIZATION

What explains legal ordering? More specifically, what explains the ordering
that is not explained by hierarchical mechanics?
To clarify the process of non-hierarchical ordering, we must supplement the
traditional image ofthe pyramid with a different image: overlapping networks that
generate interpenetrating forms and nortns. This Part presents a self-organizing
model of legal systems, with particular application to bankruptcy. First, I specify
some organizational features of the bankruptcy law system. Next, noting again
that hierarchical mechanics explain a good deal of the ordering we observe in
bankruptcy, I will attempt to probe the limits of the hierarchical explanations.
Finally, I attempt to construct a model of self-organization. Building on a diverse
body of research in the physical and social sciences, I will describe (1) the
structures of self-organization, and (2) the dynamics of interaction within and
among those structures.

120

This turn of phrase was suggested to me by my colleague, Marc Galanter.

•
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A. Organizational Features of the Bankruptcy Legal System
121

An organizational analysis ofbankruptcy should begin with a listing of the
relevant system players. Significant actors in the bankruptcy legal system include
at least the following:
Bench
122

•

the 326 bankruptcy courts (comprised of the bankruptcy judge and the
personnel in his or her chambers, including administrative staff and
judicial law clerks);
• the clerk of each bankruptcy court (and his or her administrative staff);
• the appellate courts (including the district courts of which bankruptcy
courts are departments, the circuit courts of appeals, the U.S. Supreme
Court, and all the relevant judicial clerks and administrative staff);
Trustees
•
•

121

the office of the U.S. Trustee and staff;
the individual trustees-in-bankruptcy (including standing trustees,
specially appointed trustees, trustee-hired professionals such as
accountants, appraisers, attorneys, and attendant administrative staffs);

There is, of course, a substantial social science literature performs organizational analyses
of legal phenomena. See, e.g., EISENSTEIN & JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE, supra note 98, passim
(discussing effect of workgroup development on various decisions in criminal courts); Grossman
et al., supra note 98, at 91-93 (noting that legal nonns "play a significant role in determining the
pace oflitigation"). In the legal literatures there is a growing call for "institutional analysis" of legal
phenomena. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, at xi (1994) (noting centrality and importance of analysis of
"institutional choice,'); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New
Theory ofRacial Discrimination, 109 YALEL.J. 1717, 1717 (2000) (suggesting institutional analysis
of racial discrimination in judiciary); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of
Discourse, and theMiQroanalysisoflnstitutions, 109 HARV. L.REv. 1393, 1393 (1996). Following
Rubin, this Article presents a "microanalysis" of the institutions active in the bankruptcy legal
system. See also Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as an
Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265, 281 (1997) (book review) (noting need for "microanalysis" to
understand actions of judiciary); Mark C. Suchman & Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Rational Myths:
The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 903, 904 ( 1996)
(book review) (discussing need for study of "interplay between fonnal rules and infonnal
practices").
122
Author's count as of October 2001.
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Bar
•

attorneys, paralegals, expert witnesses (such as appraisers and financial
modelers), and administrative staff;

Consumers
•

•
•

•

•

clients (including repeat players such as organizations that frequently
exercise debt-collection and other lender-related powers, and one-time
players such as most consumer debtors);
other affected parties (e.g., employers ordered, via employer wage orders,
to pay debtors' wages directly to a trustee);
near-clients (comprising those actors who have not consumed
bankruptcy-related goods, but are connected to the system because they
may someday be in a position to consume bankruptcy-related goods);
non-clients (including the social and business networks of clients);

the substantial apparatus surrounding Congress and the Executive,
including lobbyists, donors, professional associations such as the
American Bankruptcy Institute, the Commercial Law League of America,
the National Bankruptcy Conference, etc.;

Cottunentators
• journalists and other organs of popularization, public opinion, and social
communication;
• scholars and academic actors.
All of these system actors play a role in the ordering of system content. At
the outset, I want to give special attention to the 326 bankruptcy courts. These
courts are trial courts, fora of first instance, and their function differs in significant
ways from the oft-studied appellate courts.
123
Bankruptcy courts produce two significant out-products. First, bankruptcy
courts distribute the benefits and burdens of bankruptcy; they administer the

123

1n characterizing the 326 bankruptcy courts organizationally as producing certain products,
I follow the pioneering work of Martin Shapiro. See Martin Shapiro, Decentralized DecisionMaking in the Law of Torts, in POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 44, 50 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., Van
Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1970) (describing tort organization as "fifty-two tops," comprised ofhighest
court of each U.S. state system, highest court of U.S. federal system, and aggregation of British
courts making tort rulings).
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discharge and automatic stay, confirrn plans of reorganization that reconfigure
contracts, oversee the distribution of the estate among creditors, and otherwise
parcel out bankruptcy's benefits and costs.
The second significant out-product of bankruptcy courts is doctrine. As an
incident of executing their task of burden and benefit distribution, bankruptcy
courts speak doctrine. Doctrine is what an organization officially proclaims and
memorializes about what it is doing. These official proclamations and
memorializations serve to orient the organization to its task, and also serve as
124
communications media to actors inside and outside the organization. Doctrine
can be the mission statement posted on the wall of a local community center, the
quarterly earnings projections announced by Microsoft, the official logging policy
for federal lands in Montana established by the U.S. Forest Service, or the favored
method for valuing a car announced by a bankruptcy court in Wisconsin. Doctrine
125
provides important evidence both of what an organization thinks of itself, and
how outside parties understand and will relate to that organization.
In addition to producing doctrine and distributing bankruptcy's benefits and
burdens, bankruptcy courts also occupy an important strategic location in the
greater bankruptcy system: bankruptcy courts, as fora of first instance, are points
of access for extra-system actors (e.g., actors from business networks or consumer
networks) to enter into the bankruptcy legal system. Trial courts are regarded as
"low-status," vis-a-vis appellate courts, because of their proximity to and
126
interaction with nonlegal actors. But it is precisely this low-status position that
locates trial courts as the best-placed receptors of fonns generated by networks
127
beyond the legal system.

•

124

See infra text accompanying notes 156-64 (discussing Macaulay's description of variation

•

in use of formal contracts).
125
See MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE 212 ( 1998) (describing process of creating doctrine in context of"phenomenology
of institutional thought").
126
JACOB, supra note 94, at 129. Jacob asserts that:
The political role of the judiciary has typically been seen to lie in the tendency of
higher courts (especially the U.S. Supreme Court) to evolve new policies as significant
as those developed by Congress or the President. Lower courts have little role in this
policy-making function. But lower courts specialize in dealing with people in
crisis .... [C]ourt appearances are not routine for most litigants.
/d. See infra Part V .B (discussing relationship between low-status and innovation in process of legal
change).
127
Sociolinguistic research has demonstrated that there is more variation in speech usage
among communities of lower social status (e.g., the inner city) than among the higher status speech
communities. See JAMES MILROY, LINGUISTIC VARIATION AND CHANGE: ON THE HISTORICAL
SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF ENGLISH 96 ( 1992). Milroy states:
It was clear ... [in] our Belfast work that to describe the inner-city phonology was a
more complicated task than to describe 'middle-class' phonology, because there
appeared to be much more variability within inner-city language than in higher status
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B. Exhausting Hierarchical Explanations
Explanations of ordering in bankruptcy properly begin with the obvious:
hierarchy. Bankruptcy law is, after all, federal law, and there are substantial
hierarchical mechanisms built into the bankruptcy system that are designed to
order system content. Can we explain bankruptcy's ordering entirely from these
blueprint features, without having to resort to the informal dynamics ofadaptation
and emergence that characterize self-organization? Before turning to a selforganizing model, we should do our best to exhaust hierarchical explanations of
ordering.
Herbert Kaufman's classic organizational analysis of the U.S. Forest
128
Service is useful as a model for the present organizational analysis of the U.S.
bankruptcy system. Both Kaufman's project and mine want to explain the
129
presence of ordering, the "unity without unifortnity" that occurs in some
organizations. Juxtaposing Kaufman's organizational analysis of the U.S. Forest
Service to an organizational analysis of the bankruptcy system shows both the
reach and the limits of purely hierarchical explanations of ordering.
The plan of Kaufman's study was to identify an organization subject to
130
powerful forces of fragmentation ("centrifugal forces" ) and then to study the
131
"techniques ofintegration" by which that organization maintained its unity and
coherence. Kaufman chose as his subject organization the U.S. Forest Service.
However, rather than study that organization top-down, beginning with its chief
administrative and policymaking offices located in the Department of Agriculture
in Washington, D.C., Kaufman instead looked to the organization's ground-level
132
operatives, selecting a sample of five "Ranger Districts" of the then extant 792

language. . . . [T]he speech community can be envisaged as being shaped like a
pyramid, with greater variability at the lower end and greater convergence (or relative
unifonnity) at the upper end.
!d. Analogizing this finding to the project of legal studies, we can hypothesize that trial networks
(i.e., lower status groups) possess higher variation and more often serve as the source of legal
innovations than appellate networks (i.e., higher status groups). See infra Part V.B (trial courts as
possible primary agents in the process of legal change).
128
HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR
( 1960).
129
/d. at 203
130
/d. at 86, 204.
131
/d. at 89.
132
This was because
[i]n public administration, it is all too common to look at agency organization from the
top down. Organization charts and description start with the head, then go to the
branches, and finally to the lower levels. There is discussion of such matters as
delegation of authority and of control by the top. This is all important; but perhaps
more significant is to look at the organization upwards from the lowest general purpose
unit in this case, from the ranger district upward. This is what the present study has
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districts charged with overseeing 181 million acres of federal lands scattered
across the United States.
Kaufman analyzed the centrifugal forces working against the unity and
coherence ofthe organization (e.g., the tremendous physical/geographical distance
between field agents; the significant local interests attempting to influence the
rangers' administration of forest resources, etc.) and asserts that the Forest Service
133
has remained, in spite of it all, relatively unified. Kaufman then defined the
"techniques ofintegration," those elements that militate against the fragmentation134
inducing centrifugal forces.
Kaufman identifies three techniques of integration: ( 1) techniques for "preforming" decisions, i.e., guiding the discretion of field officers; (2) techniques for
monitoring field officers; and (3) techniques for selecting and training field
135
officers. The first two are explicitly hierarchical. The third, while substantially
hierarchical, begins to intimate a dynamics of emergence that points us in the
direction of self-organization.
1. Pre-forming decisions
136

What Kaufman calls ''procedural devices for pre-fortning decisions"
consists mainly of a single written resource: the Forest Service Manual, a

done.
Marion Clawson, Foreword to KAUFMAN, supra note 128, at vii.
133
KAUFMAN, supra note 128, at 204:
[T]hree things appear too pronounced, particularly when compared with the private
sector of the forest economy, to be the result of unco-ordinated actions of individual
Rangers: the consistent, long-tenn connection between announced goals and actual
perfotmance; the responsiveness of production to changes in leadership objectives; and
the steady march of perfonnance records toward goals of the leaders .... Despite the
centrifugal forces at work in national forest administration, the actual accomplishments
of field units have been brought into agreement with the mission defined by the officials
in central headquarters.
/d.
134
/d. at 89-91.
135
/d. at 91, 13 7, 161.
136
/d. at 91. Kaufman states:
Since it is clear that the organizations for national forest administration might
disintegrate if each field officer made entirely independent decisions about the handling
of his district, many decisions.are made for them in advance of specific situations
requiring choice .... [E]vents and conditions in the field are anticipated as fully as
possible, and courses of action to be taken for designated categories of such events and
conditions are described. The field officers then need determine only into what category
a particular circumstance falls; once this determination is made, he then simply follows
the series of steps applicable to that category. Within each category, therefore, the
decisions are "pre... fonned."
/d. (citation omitted).
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multivolume, 3000-plus-page set ofloose.leafbinders "put out by the Washington
office of the Forest Service, which incorporates, explicates, and interprets the
137
relevant legal documents applicable to the agency.''
The manual is
138
supplemented by regional and local directives. "From free ... use permits to huge
sales of timber, from burning permits to fighting large fires, from requisitioning
office supplies to maintaining discipline, classes of situations and patterns of
139
response are detailed in the Manual. Every action is guided."
Bankruptcy also has its manual. In the world of bankruptcy practice the
sections of the U.S~ Bankruptcy Code (along with the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure) are the predominant means of "pre-forming_" decisions.
Like the Forest Service manual, the Code is the common text of the entire
profession, and stands as authoritative. Unlike the Forest Service manual, the
Code is not the product of an administrative agency. Because it is a federal statute,
the words of the Code are revisited and revised by Congress only infrequently and
at extremely high cost. And, as we have seen, it is relatively rare that the words
of the Code are clarified via the construction of an authoritative appellate court.
Moreover, there is much that the Code, even on its face, unavoidably leaves "up
for grabs" in both the procedure and substance of bankruptcy law.
•

2. Monitoring
The second set of"integration techniques" identified by Kaufman are devices
140
for "detecting and discouraging deviation." These include reports that field
officers write at the request of the leadership and ''official diaries" kept by the
rangers, assistant rangers, and their principal aides
show[ing] to the nearest half-hour how each workday is spent. On
standard [U.S. Forest] Service-wide forms, the field officers and
employees record each thing they do, describing the activity in enough
detail for any inspector to identify it, the functions to which the activity
is chargeable, the time at which it began and was completed, and the
amount of office, travel, and field time that it entailed. They thus
141
compile a full running record of the way they employ their time.

137

See id. at 95.
138
ld. at 97.
139
Id. at 96.
140
I d. at 126.
141Jd. at 130--31. The comparison to the "every six minutes" billing records of a law finn is
obvious .

•
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These reports and diaries are regularly reviewed by higher-ups who then
142
scold or praise as occasion sees fit. Other means of monitoring field officers
143
include: inspections by internal auditors; appeals by private parties of field
officers' decisions (e.g., the decision not to grant a grazing pertnit to a particular
144
private livestock concern) to the officers' superiors; frequent reassignment of
145
field officers to other geographical regions within the Forest Service; and
146
internal sanctions.
·
Such monitoring of the "field officers" ofbankruptcy (i.e., the judges ofU.S.
bankruptcy courts) is more difficult to measure. For a bankruptcy judge, the most
natural form of being monitored by superiors is having your decisions subject to
review and reversal by a higher court. As we have seen, the probability of
meaningful review in any given case is statistically very low. Yet most bankruptcy
judges are very sensitive to the possibility of review. To minimize the chances of
reversal, many judges almost certainly adjust their behavior in infortnal ways that
147
are difficult for an outside observer
to measure or detect.
.
Another significant means of monitoring bankruptcy judges is the
reappointment process. Bankruptcy judges serve fourteen-year terms and are
subject to reappointment by the relevant court of appeals, often considering the
148
The possibility of not being
recommendation of the local bankruptcy bar.
reappointed is likely to exert influen.c e on job perfonnance.
.

3. Selection and training ofpersonnel
Kaufman's third set of "integration techniques" involves the selection and
training of personnel . as Kaufman names it, "developing the will and capacity
150
149
to conform" 'by first "selecting men who fit" and then fostering their loyalty

142

/d. at 131-34.
143
/d. at 137.
144
/d. at 153.
145
/d. ·at 155-56.
146
/d. at 157.
147
In a valuation dispute, for example, a bankruptcy judge might tend to split the difference
between the values argued for by the two parties as a way of diminishing the chances of appeal.
148
While reappointment is the nonnal course, the rare failure to be reappointed receives
substantial attention among the bankruptcy bench and bar. See, e.g., Anne Colden, Pioneer
Bankruptcy Judge Won't See Her Term Renewed, DENVER POST, Apr. 22, 2000, at Cl. Judge
Patricia Ann Clark of the District of Colorado Bankruptcy Court was denied reappointment.
''[A]ccording to some members of the Colorado Bar, ... Clark made some enemies during her years
on the bench .... A subcommittee of the Colorado Bar Association solicited opinions about whether
Clark should be reappointed." !d. See generally Bankruptcy's Reappointment Mess, 36 BANKR. CT.
DECISIONS NEWS & COMMENT, Oct. 18, 2000, No. 18 (discussing shortcomings in existing
bankruptcy judge reappointment process).
149
KAUFMAN, supra note 128, at 161.
150/d.
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to the Forest Service. He discusses the rites of recruiting and training, including
the rigorous program of frequently relocating officers to a wide variety of posts
151
all over the county, especially early in their careers.
Bankruptcy also has its rites of selection and training. Bankruptcy judges are
selected by the regional court of appeals, which often will rely upon a
recommendation of the local bankruptcy bar, which has agreed to put forward one
of its own. Bankruptcy judges are trained, first, as all lawyers are trained, through
the reorientation of a law school education and the discipline of practice, and then,
as bankruptcy judges, by their peers and by the members of the bar that appear
before them. Additionally, the Federal Judicial Center operates annual training
programs for all bankruptcy judges ("baby judges' school") and publishes
resource manuals for use by the judges. Also, there are multiple professional
associations and annual conferences that serve to cultivate the exchange of
152
ideas.
Kaufman concluded that the three "integration techniques" (i.e., pre-forming,
monitoring, selection, and training) explain the unity and coherence he observed
in the U.S. Forest Service. While that might have been a satisfactory conclusion
in the case of the U.S. Forest Service in 1960, it is not at all clear that these
integration techniques fully explain the ordering we observe in U.S. bankruptcy
law. In that sense, Kaufman's project ends where the present project begins.
Going beyond Kaufman's approach, we distinguish between the hierarchical
mechanisms that he examined, and other, non-hierarchical, forces for integration.
The first two of Kaufman's "integration techniques" are expressly hierarchical:
the publication of texts, like the Forest Service manual, and the monitoring of
inferior officers by their superiors both depend on the existence and successful
deliberate implementation of a hierarchical chain-of-command. Kaufman's third
technique, selection and training of personnel, is also presented as a sort of
blueprint device, but with the intimation that there is something more dynamical
and emergent going on. Kaufman leaves the dynamics of emergence substantially
unexplored.
This Article's description of the bankruptcy system will focus on the
dynamics of emergence. I attempt this description not because I want to show a
153
gap between blueprint and reality. Rather, I want to prescind entirely from the

151

/d. at 176.
152
National organizations include the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, the
American Bankruptcy Institute, the Commercial Law League of America, the Turnaround
Management Association, and the National Bankruptcy Conference. Additionally, there are
specialized bar associations for bankruptcy professionals, organized by judicial district.
153
Which is, incidentally, like shooting fish in a barrel. We see gaps between our fonnal
blueprints and the reality of legal systems just about every time we try, and we should learn from
this only that our blueprints are biased and infirm. Since our biases generate our perception of the
existence of gaps, the gap studies approach to scholarship may be something of an artificial
exercise. See Galanter, Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 257 ("The perception of a 'gap' proceeds
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blueprint perspective, and approach the task of description from a different, and
154
hopefully unbiased, direction.

C. A Self-Organizing Model
155

This Section outlines a model of self-organizing legal systems. Such a
model should include: ( 1) a description of the structures; and (2) a description of
the structures' dynamics (i.e., the way that self-organizing structures order system
content via the innovation of forms and the emergence of norms).

1. Self-organizing structures
Stewart Macaulay's classic 1963 article on noncontractual relations among
156
businesspeople is often cited for the proposition that formal contracts control
only a small portion ofbusiness exchanges. That proposition, however, rests upon
the substantial foundation ofMacaulay's descriptive empirical research on dozens

from and expresses an expectation of hannony or congruence between authoritative nonnative
learning and patterns of action.").
154
Recall Blau's lapidary formulation:
Most discussions [of emergence in organizations] contrast infonnal relationships and
practices with the fonnal blueprint of the organization. This emphasizes ·the least
interesting aspect of the concept of"informal organization," namely, that behavior and
relationships often fail to confonn exactly to fonnal prescriptions, which is certainly
not a novel discovery. Much more significant is the insight that such activities and
interactions are not simply idiosyncratic deviations but forn1 consistent patterns that are
new elements of the organization. . . . [O]rganizations do not statically remain as they
had been conceived but always develop into new fonns of organization.
BLAU, supra note 74, at 2-3. See also Abel, supra note 9, at 189. Abel states that:
This continuing preoccupation with the gap problem has had unfortunate consequences
for the development of a social theory of law. Scholarship is confined to a single
question, seen from two perspectives: why does behavior deviate from law; why does
law mandate a conformity which is not forthcoming? We are thus directed to particular
gaps between law and behavior, and how we may close them. But ... we cannot
entertain the possibility of another relationship between law and behavior, or begin the
construction of a more complex model in which law and behavior interact without a
one-to-one correspondence.
/d. (citation omitted).
155
A substantial amount of research in the physical sciences has been going forward under the
general name of"self-organizing ctjticality :"For an introduction by one ofthe founding researchers
in the field, see generally PER BAK, How NATURE WORKS 1( 1996) ("The aim of the science of selforganized criticality is to yield insight into the fundamental question of why nature is complex, not
simple, as the laws of physics imply."); see also Per Bak et al., Self-Organized Criticality, 38
PHYSICAL REV. 364, 364 (1988) (discussing behavior of dynamical systems which organize
naturally into critical state).
156
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.

Soc. REV. 55, 62 (1963).
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of businesses in Wisconsin. It is the picture that Macaulay's research paints of
these businesses that is most exciting and significant for the purposes of this
Article.
Macaulay asks the question: when are relations among businesspeople
governed by formal norn1s (e.g., contracts) and when by informal norrns (e.g.,
157
158
trust, tit-for-tat, etc.)? Through the prism of that question, Macaulay develops
a portrait of a business in action, which I have attempted to represent in Figure 4.
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Compared with the clean, straight lines of the pyramids illustrated in the
abstractions at Figures 1 and 2, Macaulay's picture of a business-as-experienced
is something of an irregular, globby mess. Macaulay's schema portrays multiple
overlapping communities generating different styles of regulation. I shall simplify
by focusing on three of the communities that Macaulay describes: (1) the
business' sales connnunity, which spends a substantial amount of time interacting
with customers; (2) the business' production community, which spends a
substantial amount of time interacting with other firtns that supply the materials
needed for production; and (3) the groups in the business that deal with legal and
compliance issues, record-keeping, and accounting, which spend lots of time
trying to record and rein in the activities of the business' sales and production

157

Robert C. Ellickson' s book develops a model of "tit-for-tat" regulation. See ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167- 83 ( 1991 ).
158
Macaulay, supra note 156, at 56.
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communities. As represented in Figure 4, each of these groups overlaps with other
159
relevant groups.
As for the question of whether forrnal or informal norms control relations,
Macaulay's work suggests that it depends on the relative occupational roles of the
60
parties to the relationship! Suppose the business is a newspaper. Folks on the
production side will have relationships with suppliers of paper and ink, and those
relationships will be practically governed by infonnal norms despite the presence
of formal contracts. Likewise, the sales staff of the newspaper will have multiple
informal and unrecorded arrangements with firms that buy advertising space in the
newspaper. People in legal/compliance and accounting will labor mightily to
record and control the activities of the people in sales and production. During
times of ordinary business, sales and production will be at the center of the firm,
with legal/compliance and accounting understood as controlling around the edges
and at the margins. During extraordinary times (bad times from the business'
perspective) such as audit time or lawsuit time, the people in legal/compliance and
accounting move to the center, with sales and production temporarily reduced to
a relatively subordinate position.
Each community within the firtn develops its unique culture, manifested as
much by the types of regulation that the conununity generates (i.e., formal,
written, enforceable contracts or inforn1al arrangements of trust, courtesies, and
161
reciprocation) as by that community's special language and vernacular, habits,
162
Occupants of these overlapping communities
methods, and expectations.
develop mannerisms and methods for dealing with people in other communities.
A salesperson will behave one way with a client, another way with a fellow
salesperson, and a very different third way with someone from
163
legal/compliance.

159

•

The figure could be filled in a bit more: "Inside" legal counsel for the business will overlap
with communities of outside counsel, communities of government regulators, and communities of
outside financial institutions. "Inside" accountants will likewise interact with "outside" regulators
and financial professionals. "Inside" sales will overlap with "outside" advertising firms, etc. The
figure should also include some representation of management that would be, to a greater or lesser
extent, integrated with all or most of the other communities.
160
Macaulay, supra note 156, at 56.
161
See id. at 66 (indicating that sales agents, who deal with customers, and productions
officers, who deal with suppliers, are less inclined to make formal contracts, and more inclined to
order via inforrnal norn1s).
162
Apropos is a Dilbert cartoon. As part of a firm-wide training program, employees are being
temporarily relocated to other departments within the finn. Dilbert, a computer techie, is assigned
to work in the sales department. He takes the elevator to the appropriate floor and alights into what
seems to be a huge party. On the wall is a sign in flashing neon lights that says, "Sales
Departrnent Three Drink Minimum."
163
See Macaulay, supra note 156, at 68 (depicting sales and productions agents as "foreign
affairs personnel" of business). Agents located at the intersecting points of communities, because
of their unique ties both inside and outside the group, are best positioned to transport norms. See
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Macaulay establishes that not only are formal contracts oftentimes altogether
missing in the governance of business relations, but also that there is wide
variation in how a contract, when present, is understood and used, and that this
variation also corresponds to the occupational role or location of the party within
64
a particular overlapping connnunity! So someone in h!gaVcompliance will
regard a contract as a legally enforceable account of rights and responsibilities.
Someone in production might see the same contract as a sort of list of what needs
to be requisitioned and when. Finally, someone in sales might use the same
contract as a convenient strategic fallback, allowing the salesperson to say to one
client, "Gosh, I really can't go outside the contract," while simply ignoring the
contract for a different client under different circumstances.
Ten years after the publication of Macaulay's article, work by Sally Falk
165
Moore contributed substantially to the two tasks we are concerned with here:
the task ofdefining structures, and the task of specifying the structures' dynamics.
F alk Moore's primary concern was methodological she wanted to state a method
by which social scientists could frame particular subjects of study. Falk Moore
called this task "field definition," using a term common in the physical sciences.
166
A social field, like a "natural field" or a "physical field," is defined functionally
(not to say, tautologically) as that entity which is the focus of the scientific study.
Where Macaulay had defined his fields (i.e., the Wisconsin businesses on which
he had gathered data} implicitly, concretely and, as it were, a-theoretically, Falk
Moore is interested in stating a general theory of the methodology of field
defmition a generalizable way oflooking that will clarify the process of selecting
and defining specific social phenomena.
For Falk Moore, fields are characteristically "semi-autonomous" and
"processual." On the characteristic of semi-autonomy, Falk Moore writes:

infra Part V .B (discussing role of low-status actors in process of legal change).
164
See Macaulay, supra note 156, at 55. Macaulay's finding that the variation in presence and
use of contracts corresponds with the "occupational role" of the actor also corresponds with the
notion that "low-status" actors (i.e., those who are weakly tied to actors in different networks) play
a crucial role in transporting norms between fields. See generally JAMES MILROY, LINGUISTIC
VARIATION AND CHANGE, at viii (1992) (exploring language change as social phenomenon);
Granovettor, Strength of Weak Ties, supra note 112, at 1360 (arguing that interpersonal networks
at micro-level translate into large-scale patterns which ultimately influence small groups);
Granovettor, Weak Ties Revisted, supra note 112, at 203 (reviewing literature dealing with impacts
of weak ties on individuals, sociological idea-flow, and social cohesion).
165
Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject ofStudy, 7 LAW & Soc'YREv. 719,719 (1973).
166
The development of social fields as an approach to law is generally associated with the
work of Bourdieu. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 814, 816 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987) ("The social practices
of the law are in fact the product of the functioning of a 'field."' (citation omitted)).
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The approach proposed here is that the small field observable to an
anthropologist be chosen and studied in terms of its semiautonomy the fact that it can generate rules and customs and symbols
internally, but that it is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other
forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded. The
semi-autonomous social field has rule-making capacities, and the means
to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger
social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the
167
invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its own instance.
These overlapping structures are further defined, Falk Moore maintains, less
by what they are than by what they do. She continues, "[t]he semi-autonomous
social field is defined and its boundaries identified not by its organization (it may
be a corporate group, it may not) but by a processual characteristic, the fact that
168
it can generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them."
In order to properly qualify as a socialfield, it is not necessary for a structure
to possess any degree of institutionalization or specialization. It is enough that the
169
structure "generate rules and coerce or induce compliance to them." Imagine a
spectrum of all social fields in which you have participated, ranging from social
fields with high specialization and institutionalization to social fields with low
specialization and institutionalization. Nearest to the high pole might appear
fonnal and enduring legal systems such as the U.S. government. Proceeding down
the spectrum, one. might encounter such entities as religious organizations and
business associations. Nearing the low pole, one might locate the neighborhood,
and then the occasional and thin ordinary networks (e.g., the barber who cuts your
hair every few weeks or the merchant who sells you a cup of coffee every
morning), and finally the group of four strangers who happened to ride in the
elevator with you this morning while silently observing a certain etiquette (stand
to the side; ifyour floor is coming up, announce this by moving to the front, and
so forth). According to Falk Moore, these are all properly understood as social
fields: each engages in self-regulation and each is subject to regulation by outside
forces.
Tracking Falk Moore's approach to field definition onto the representation
of a business displayed in Figure 4, we see that there are at least six "semiautonomous social fields" denominated in the figure: (1) the finn, (2) the finn's
legal/compliance and accounting departments, (3) the firm's production
department, (4) the firtn' s sales department, (5) the firm's suppliers, and (6) the
fim1's customers. Each.of these fields has the capacity, within its own group, to
generate rules and coerce compliance with those rules, and each is subject to some
•

167

Falk Moore, supra note 165, at 720.
168
/d. at 722 (emphasis added).
169!d.
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outside regulation. Look closer at Figure 4, however, and several additional fields
appear. For example, the point of intersection between sales and customers
defines a separate field of interaction, in which unique norms and languages
develop; similarly the point of intersection between sales and legal/compliance.
Hence the processual feature of this method of field definition a field is defined
not by an ex ante idealization or fortnal abstraction (such as an organizational
flowchart depicting the firm with its various departments neatly arranged) but
rather by what it does: ·generate and communicate forms.
For the purposes of explicating the bankruptcy legal system, I offer two
alterations to the task of field definition, again following on methodological
advances associated with the physical sciences. First, I will not refer to fields but
110
rather to networks. Networks are collections ofconnected elements. In the social
sciences such as legal studies, the elements are the actors (e.g.,judges, attorneys,
paralegals, administrative assistants) and the connections are the relationships, or
ties, that run between the actors. Networks, with its specification of elements and
connections, may allow for more precision than fields in describing the
interconnections of bankruptcy actors. Second, a useful way of representing
networks is through the use of graphs, i.e., dots (the elements) drawn with lines
of various sorts (the connections) running between the dots. "Graph th~ory" is an
171
important area of study in mathematics.

17

<Network-based methodologies are becoming increasingly important as a basic research tool
in the sciences. See generally BARABASI, supra note 82, at 7 ("This book has a simple aim: to get
you to think networks. It is about how networks emerge, what they look like, and how they
evolve."); BUCHANAN, supra note 82, at 22 ("Nexus focuses on a number of the world's most
important networks ....");STEVEN STROGATZ, SYNC: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SPONTANEOUS
ORDER 1 (2003) (exploring·science of"spontaneous order in the universe"); DUNCAN J. WATIS, SIX
DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 16 (2003) ("[T]his book is ... a story about the
science of networks.").
171
SeeGARYCHARTRAND,INTRODUCTORYGRAPHTHEORY,atvi{l985). Specifically, a graph
is a set of vertices and edges (G = (V, E)). Each edge has an edge-weight, which is stated as a
function. For the simplest graph, imagine two parties ("vertices") A and B, with the edge (A, B)
'
running between them, and the edge-weight for edge (A, B) = 1. Thus we have a mathematical
description of a two-party, strong-ties, network. See id. at 10-19. Using this notation, we can
elegantly and usefully describe very complex organizations. See also Kathleen M. Carley &
Vanessa Hill, Structural Change and Learning Within Organizations, in DYNAMICS OF
ORGANIZATIONS: COMPUTATIONAL MODELING AND ORGANIZATION THEORIES 63, 89-90
(Alessandro Lomi & Erik R. Larsen eds., 200 I) (discussing computational modeling for network
analysis).
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Fie:ure 5

Susan, Sales
•

Margie, representative
for the Bingaman Account

-----Tom, Sales

Chuck, Sales

To see the competitive advantage of network graphs over fields, consider
Figure 5 as a specification of one detail represented in Figure 4. Nothing like the
amorphous blobs represented in Figure 4 really exist. When you walk into the
sales department of a business, you do not see a blob labeled "Sales" overlapping
with a blob labeled "Customers." You see Chuck, a salesman, on the phone with
Margie, who represents the Bingaman account. And not only does depicting
networks with graphs allow for a higher degree of actor specification, it also
allows us to specify the relationships between the actors we can see which
actors are connected by strong ties (represented in Figure 5 by the solid lines
connecting the three members of the sales staff), and which are connected by weak
ties (shown in Figure 5 as the dotted line connecting Chuck·with Margie).
172
Falk Moore also speaks to the variation in the types of "rules" that are
generated by semi-autonomous structures. After laying out two empirical case
studies (the operation of the better dress line in New York City's garment trade,
and attempts to legislate social change in Tanzania) Falk Moore writes:
These examples all involve at least two kinds of rules: rules that
were consciously made by legislatures and courts and other formal
agencies to produce certain intended effects, and rules that could be said
to have evolved "spontaneously" out of social life. Rules of corporate
organizations, whether they are the laws of a polity or the rules of an
organization within it, frequently involve attempts to fix certain
relationships by design. However, the ongoing competitions,

172

In the vernacular of this Article, Falk Moore's "rules" are fonns and potential norms.
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collaborations and exchanges that take place in social life also generate
their own regular relationships and rules and effective sanctions,
without necessarily involving any such pre-designing. The ways in
which state-enforceable law affects these processes are often
exaggerated and the way in which law is affected by them is often
underestimated. Some semi-autonomous social fields are quite
enduring, some exist only briefly. Some are consciously constructed,
such as committees, administrative departments, or other groups fortned
to perfortn a particular task; while some evolve in the marketplace or
173
the neighborhood or elsewhere out of a history of transactions.
Putting Falk Moore's argument into the vernacular of this Article, ordering
of system content occurs through both hierarchic organization and selforganization. Hierarchic explanations of ordering contend that order exists
because hierarchically inferior actors execute the directives of their superiors.
Alternatively, a self-organizing explanation describes a system with many
generative centers rather than one, and with the flow of authority running outward
from the various centers, rather than from the top downwards, as in a hierarchic
174
model. Unlike the hierarchic model, where the order sought is the product of
some deliberately intended grand design or blueprint, spontaneous ordering yields
a result that is the product of many individual human wills but of no grand human
175
design.

2. Self-organizing dynamics
We have specified the structures of self-organizing systems: semiautonomous networks, comprised ofelements, and connections between elements,
that order system content through the development of forms and the emergence

173

Falk Moore, supra note 165, at 744 45.
174
Shapiro, supra note 123, at 44, 46. Shapiro states that: [S]uch major policies as that of
private control of timber resources or the allocation of industrial loss to workers rather than
entrepreneurs are not made and announced by a single court on a single day but are the product of
a large number of decentralized, nonhierarchical, and differentially motivated decisions by a large
number ofjudges, counsellors, pleaders, academic commentators and litigants over long periods of
time and, for the most part, with no formally defined, continuing relation among the participants
or their decisions.
/d. (citation omitted).
115
See, e.g., I F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 39 (1973)
(providing examples of spontaneous order in nature whereby large number of facts unknown in
totality influence order). See generally RUDI KELLER, ON LANGUAGE CHANGE: THE INVISIBLE
HAND IN LANGUAGE, at ix (Brigitte Nerlich trans., 1994) (1990) (applying combination of
spontaneous order and invisible hand theory to changes in linguistics); BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, at x-xi ( 1996) (observing that biological and cultural evolution are
driven by mutation and recombination, which influences social contract).

UTAH LAW REVIEW

536

[2004: 483

of norms. But how does this self-organization occur? Can we specify the
dynamics of a self-organizing legal system?
In natural systems, the ordering of system content involves two processes:
mutation, which introduces multiple forms into a given system; and natural
selection, the process by which one or more of these fortns, well-fitted to survive
the system's environment, become the norm. Similarly, self-organization in a
legal system involves two processes: ( 1) the innovation of forms, and (2) the
emergence of norms.

(a) Form Innovation
How do forms get into a system? Where does system content come from?
176
Many forms come from the creative strategies of particular system actors.
Lawyers, for example, attempting to achieve some client objective, will
reconfigure existing apparatus to some innovative end or otherwise generate a
177
novel legal position.
Other forms are transmitted into one system after having originated in
178
another system.
I shall refer to this method of form innovation as
transportation-cum-distortion. A substantial body of socio-legal research on
179
"dispute transfortnation" has shown that conununications of meaning undergo
176

See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49
DUKEL.J. 1405, 1407-13 (2000) (highlighting role of lawyers elaborating "strategic" theory of legal
innovation: locating creative element in legal systems in bar rather than bench); Mark C. Suchman
& Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression ofBusiness Disputes
in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY679, 679 (1996) (discussing strategies of Silicon Valley
lawyers).
117
See infra Part V.A.2.(a) (giving examples offonn innovation via lawyer creativity, such
as the pre-packaged Chapter 11 plan).
178
M ore can be said about this process of fonn transportation. For example, it is possible that
the fonns that are transported are typically robust, having achieved a nonnative status in the sending
system; e.g., sophisticated valuation techniques (qua fonn), widely used in business networks, are
gradually transported into legal networks (see infra Part V .A.2.(b)(i) discussion of discounted cash
flow models). Also, we may be able to say that the network actors through which fonns are
transmitted inter-system are often weakly tied, in that they are not central (i.e., not strongly tied) to
either the business network or the legal network. This would suggest an important role for lowstatus actors (the trial courts in legal systems) in the process of innovation.
179
See Trubek, Where the Action Is, supra note 63, at 621 (''[D]ispute transformation [explores
how] the nature, intensity, and trajectory of social conflicts are affected by the intervention of
various actors, including lawyers." (citation omitted)). See, e.g., William L.F. Felsteiner et al., The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming .. ., 15 LAW & Soc'v
REv. 631, 632 ( 1980-81) (providing "a framework within which the emergence and transfonnation
of disputes can be described"); Susan Staiger Gooding, Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities
in United States v. Oregon, Confederated Tribes ofthe Colville Reservationt Plaintiff-Intervenor,
28 LAw & Soc' Y REv. 1181, 1181 ( 1994) ("[E]xplor[ ing] the socially and culturally based identities
at stake in a current treaty rights case and the mediation of these identities within a framework of
legal rights."); Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation
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changes as they move between actors from various systems (e.g., from family
actors or business actors to legal actors). In another context, the legal sociologist
Gunther Teubner has developed a similar notion. Describing the
180
"'interdiscursivity," Teubner observes in systems of "legal pluralism" (i.e., the
overlapping: or semi-autonomous networks comprising the structures of a self181
organizing system), that:
The dynamics of legal pluralism cannot be understood by a
common logics of the discourses involved, be it the transaction
economics of law and organization, the politics of omnipresent micropower, the socio-logies of social control, or yesterday's political
economy. Rather, it is the radical diversity of discourses the internal
rationality of the organization, the exigencies of the market, the
idiosyncracies of personal interaction, and the intrinsic logics of diverse
public and ~'private" legal orders that are responsible for distorted
182
communication in legal pluralism.
The intersystem dynamic of forn1 transportation-cum-distortion runs both
ways. For example, a business system (e.g., a firm or a set offirn1s) may import
a set of directives about, say, employment discrimination, from legal systems
(e.g., courts or administrative agencies), and may even import procedural
apparatus (such as grievance connnittees sitting as intra-organizational dispute
resolution devices) from legal systems. In the process of receiving and
implementing these legal forms, however, the firn1 will stylize them to fit the

ofDisputes, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 775,775 (1980-81):
Our aim in this paper is to suggest the usefulness of the concept ~transformation of a
dispute' in ( 1) improving our understanding of how people manage processes of
disputing and (2) showing how law and other normative frameworks are articulated,
imposed, circumvented, and created as people negotiate social order in their
transactions with one another.
; David M. Trubek, Studying Courts in Context, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 485,487 (1980-81) (using
dispute focused approach in studying role of civil courts). An example of dispute transformation,
which also illustrates the fact that there are multiple and different networks within a single legal
system, is the way that the framing of a case changes as it works its way up the appellate chain:
usages and techniques familiar to (and perhaps originating from) extra-legalnetworks (e.g., business
firms or families) are gradually boiled down to pure doctrinal considerations recognizable only to
a lawyer.
180

Teubner, supra note 72, at 1453.
181
See supra Part IV. C.l (discussing self-organizing structures).
182
Teubner, supra note 72, at 1456 (emphasis added). Teubner suggests that "'legal phenomena
[emerge] in the context ofhighly specialized discourses ... which the law then misreads as sources
ofnonn production.'' /d. at 1457. See generally Clune, supra note 66, at 74 (developing model for
understanding implementation of laws and regulation wherein mutiple levels of interaction amongst
various stakeholders influence outcomes).
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firrn's particular environment and business goals.
Running in the other
direction, a legal system may import a technique or argument that is in play in an
extra-legal system (e.g., a business conm1unity or a civil rights community), but
184
tailor its implementation in ways specific to the legal environment. This process
of creative miscommunication contributes to the generation of the variable fortns
that comprise system content.
A special case of transportation-cum-distortion occurs in systems (such as
legal systems) that have a hierarchical structure: a network of hierarchically
superior actors will sometimes direct a fortn into a network of hierarchically
inferior actors, and that form will be effectively rejected by the hierarchic
inferiors. This pattern of"ukase-rejection" was explained by Malcolm Feeley and
Edward Rubin, in their important book on judicial policymaking and prison
185
reform. Exploring the relationship between appellate courts and fora of first
instance, Feeley and Rubin suggest that the appellate courts' task of consolidating
186
doctrine is typically nothing more than "coordination," i.e., appellate courts take
notice of the ways that trial courts resolve a problem and, in a sense, follow their
187
lead. Appellate courts, under this model, speak most effectively when they echo
188
a conclusion already worked out among the various trial courts.
Appellate courts stray from simple coordination when they face what Feeley
and Rubin call a "ukase." A ukase is a hierarchical superior's attempt to order
system content in a way that displaces the self-organizing already in progress

183

See PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 32 passim ( 1969); Lauren
B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion ofDue Process
in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401, 1406-17, 1435-37 (1990); see also Teubner,
supra note 72, at 1453-54 (discussing movement of legal standards to implementation by
organization).
184
See infra Part V.A.2 (noting case study of lien-stripping and empirical evidence on
bankruptcy valuation are examples of transportation-cum-distortion of forms from business to legal
networks).
185
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125, at 226-52. See also Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1989, 1991 (1996) (presenting theory of judicial
lawmaking).
186
Coordination takes place "either horizontally or vertically; that is, it either emerges from
the collective actions of various institutional actors or it is imposed by the leaders of the institution."
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125, at 229. See id. (describing "collective action" attributed to
horizontal coordination as three-step process). Feeley and Rubin's process of "horizontal
coordination" is, in the vernacular of this Article, a form of self-organization. According to Feeley
and Rubin, an example of "vertical coordination" is the appeal, and especially the consolidating
effects that a U.S. Supreme Court declaration allegedly has upon the practice of law in a targeted
area. See id. at 231.
187/d.
188
See id. ("(M]ost major Supreme Court cases represent the culmination of a coordination
process that began horizontally, among the federal trial and appellate courts. While this pattern is
far from universal, it is much more common than is generally assumed.").
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189

among hierarchical inferiors. Feeley and Rubin claim that "[ c ]reating doctrine
precipitously, without waiting for the coordination process to generate a solution
that seems relatively continuous with preexisting legal doctrine, is thus the
190
situation that would raise the most serious legitimacy problems."
191
Hierarchically inferior actors will often give the ukase a cool reception.
Feeley and Rubin note that even when a hierarchically superior court expressly
directs a legal fortn at inferior courts (via the ukase) the form may sometimes be
192
effectively rejected by the inferior courts.
Summarizing the process of fortn innovation: (1) much fonn innovation
occurs via the creative strategizing of system actors (e.g., lawyers); (2) fotrns are
also innovated by being transported-cum-distorted from, for example, a business
network to a bankruptcy trial network (i.e., from an extra-system actor to a system
actor); (3) a special case of the transportation-cum-distortion process in
hierarchically structured systems involves the ukase-rejection pattern, in which
a hierarchically superior actor (e.g., an appellate court) directs a ukase at an
inferior actor, which then effectively rejects that ukase. These devices of forn1
innovation may explain much of the variable system content that we observe.

189

I d. at 246. ("Our ... judiciaries ... are ultimately hierarchical, headed by a supreme court
whose decisions possess authoritative force. This creates the possibility ... that the jurisdiction's
supreme court will dispense with the coordination process and operate by ukase."). Of course, this
Article offers a substantial qualification to the claim that "our judiciaries are ultimately
hierarchical." Hierarchy reigns but does not rule.
190
/d. at 247. Note how Feeley and Rubin's account of the institutional condition of hierarchy
turns the conventional account of hierarchy on its head. For commentators such as Bussel and
Epstein, a functioning pyramidal and hierarchical structure is a sine qua non for a legitimate legal
system. See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing hierarchic aspects of appellate review in bankruptcy). For
Feeley and Rubin, a legal system is never closer to illegitimacy than when it orders content via
hierarchical command. See also Robert M. Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical Analysis
of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 Mo. L. REv. 101, 104-11 (1997) (highlighting benefits of
"percolation'' before case is taken by U.S. Supreme Court).
191
1t is unpredictable how a ukase sent from one network will actually affect the target. Falk
Moore concludes that many attempts to affect social life through legislation or other deliberate legal
means have unpredictable outcomes because the nonns issued by the state (in the fonn of social
welfare legislation, for example) encounter and must interact with nonns already in place in the
fields that are the target of the legislation. See Falk Moore, supra note 165, at 742-45. Some of the
notnts of the "sending field" are adopted by the "receiving field," some are substantially modified,
and some are simply ignored. /d. at 719-20.
192
ln the cases where the U.S. Supreme Court tries to issue a ukase, it is possible that the lower
courts will reject the spirit of the suggested doctrinal change by limiting the ukase to its facts. See
FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125, at 231-32 (recounting Jones v. Alfred H Mayer, Co., in which
U.S. Supreme Court tried clever theory of Thirteenth Amendment for discrilJlination by private
persons). While ''[t]he decision itself was clever, ... it served no coordinating role for the lower
courts [and] they ... regularly rejected any claims ... that went beyond the precise facts of the
Jones case." /d. (citations omitted); see infra Part V.A.2.(a) (discussing Dewsnup v. Timm).
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(b) Norm emergence
Now we turn our attention from forn1s to norms~ Having explored the origin
of a system's variable content (analogous to the theory of mutation in
evolutionary explanations of natural systems), we now ask the question: by what
193
process do some of these forms emerge as normative?
The obvious answer in legal systems is that norms emerge via hierarchical
command, because the Supreme Court (or the President, or the Congress, or the
final rule-making body of an administrative agency) said so. This is a sort of
ordering ex machina. But we have seen that hierarchical mechanisms of ordering
are under-explanatory, and we are challenged to explain the order that is
194
unexplained by 'hierarchical command. How does system content self-organize?
In natural systems, the mechanism of self-organization is called natural
selection forms fittest to the particular environment survive and come to
characterize the system. In social systems (specifically, the legal systems we
consider here), we also need a principle ofjitness to the environment that explains
the process ofnorm emergence. Fitness in nature often involves attributes such as
size, strength, speed, coloration, or intelligence. One principle of fitness in a legal
system may be redundancy.
To· explain, it is useful to review some of the work of Martin Shapiro, a
political scientist who grappled with the problem ofhow ordering occurs in a legal
195
system that lacks significant hierarchical properties.
Shapiro explored the
196
"organization" that produces tort doctrine. He defined a network with "fifty-two
tops": the highest court of each state system, the highest court of the federal
197
system, and an aggregation of the British courts that produce tort doctrine.
Shapiro wrote:
If each of these fifty-two tops were relatively independent for tort
purposes, we would simply have a good case for comparative study of
comparable decision~making organizations similar to a study of fiftytwo super market chains. What makes tort so interesting for the study
of organizational policy-making, however, is that there are not fifty-two
bodies of tort policy but in a very real sense a single body of AngloAmerican tort law that runs throughout England and the United States,
with local variations to be sure, but with a remarkably uniform core.
193

Recalling the algebraic forn1ulation: What is the relationship between variable system
conten. t (.a Ec -_ j.J 1, p.2 , J..l3, jJ4 , j.J, 5, j.J,6 , j.J,7 , p, 8, p.9, J.l JO, ... Jl n) and or·dered syst em con· t ent (A.
Y-' Ec -.1
1
I
l
2
I
l
l
l
l
1)?
.

J1 ,p, ,p ,p ,j..t ,p ,p ,p, ,p, ,p ' .. ·J.l .
194

See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 1, 13-17
(2001) (identifying and describing different actors that challenge and help develop notms).
195
Shapiro, supra note 123, at 44.
196
/d. at 46-47.
197
/d. at 50.
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The puzzle is how fifty-two appellate decision-makers, none legally or
politically subordinated to any of the others, arrive at such a unified
198
body of policy.
.
Summarizing the problem, Shapiro asked: "[H]ow do a large number of
decision-makers manage to arrive at well-coordinated policy decisions (policy
decisions are the output of this organization) when the organization is bereft of all
the mechanisms of hierarchical control that we associate with classical
199
organizational structures?" The progression of Shapiro's resolution of the
problem is worth quoting at length:
[O]ur attention is immediately drawn to communications phenomena.
A logical first guess would be that the organization [i.e·., the tort-policyproducing organization with the fifty-two tops] has developed some set
of special communications techniques that allow its decision-makers to
cooperate to substitute, somehow, mutual influence for command
from above. Because of the large number of decision-makers, an.d the
very large volume of decisions necessary to keep tort policy attuned to
a changing society, we would expect these conununications techniques
to absorb a disproportionately large share of the organization's
resources. In fact ... we find a vast body of communications personnel.
The litigational market assures that thousands of lawyers will devote
their energies to carrying messages from one·court to the next, keeping
each informed of what the others are doing. This flow of
communications is not co·n trolled by conscious plan or carefully
structured communications networks, but rather by hundreds of
thousands of individual decisions guided by the desire for personal
profit. I use the term litigational market precisely because I wish to
suggest an "invisible hand." For this market, like Adam Smith's, has
many rules and conventions that harness individual greed to a higher
cause. Under the rules of the game, the lawyer-communicator has the
highest chance of winning if he can show a court that his client must
prevail if the court keeps doing exactly what it has been doing; the next
highest chance if he can persuade the court that it should do exactly
what some other court has been doing; the next highest chance if he can
convince it to do something slightly different from what it or some other
court has been doing; and the worst prospect if he must argue that the

198

/d. at 50-51. One should note that a study of fifty-two independent supermarket chains
would very likely demonstrate a coordination in pricing similar to the coordination Shapiro
observed in doctrine, for many of the same reasons.
199
Martin Shapiro, Toward a Theory ofStare Decisis, 1 j. LEGAL STUD. 125, 130 (1972).
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court should do something markedly different from what it and other
200
courts have done in the past.
Shapiro describes a semi-autonomous network (i.e., the area of intersection
between courts and the bar) governed by the fitness principle of redundancy,
whereupon the judge wants to rule in a way that is consistent with prior court
rulings and the litigator wants to convince the judge that, if the judge acts with the
201
wonted redundancy, it means victory for the litigator's client. Redundancy is
the grammar of litigation, just as courtesies and reciprocation are the grammar of
sales, and formal planning and recording are the grammar of legal/compliance.
Every action taken or strategy proposed is evaluated, and its relative value
202
determined, by referring to the criteria of redundancy.
Shapiro's concept of the "litigational market" helps explain the process of
non-hierarchical norm emergence. Litigators want to win. And they know that
courts judge arguments as winners or losers based, at least in significant part, on
203
the principle of redundancy. Courts, for their part, base the resolution of cases
204
on the "messages" that litigators carry "from one court to the next" Litigators

200

/d. at 131 (emphasis added) .. Shapiro presents a social scientific analysis of what every
judge and litigator instinctively knows: lawyers work for the court, virtually as an extension of court
personnel; the success and prestige of a litigator is directly proportional to the degree to which she
comes to be perceived as a trusted advisor to the judge.
201
Shapiro presents a theory of the maintenance of system content (i.e., judges want to render
decisions that will not stick out) and a theory of the change of system content (i.e., judges can be
coaxed into m~king what Shapiro refers to as "cybernetic changes, so long as they approximate
"syntactic continuity''). See id. at 133-34.
202
In evolutionary terms, one can say that the environment rewards redundancy, and that an
argument's fitness corresponds to its degree of redundancy. The really interesting question, of
course, is how redundancy came to define the environment. In legal and social systems, purely
naturalistic explanations (e.g., "you gotta swim fast around here because otherwise you will get
eaten by that shark'') are unavailable. See, e.g., ISSAC D. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL
REPRESSION: BLACK REBELS BEFORE THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTS, atxii (1973) ("[T]he form
ofrepression is even more important than the ... concrete severity ofthe sanctions which emanate
from [the] fonn .. ~ ."). See also David M. Trubek, Complexity and Contradiction in the Legal
Order: Balbus and the Challenge ofCritical Social Thought About Law, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 529,
529 ( 1977) (review of Balbus book).
203
Redundancy is the principle of fitness from the viewpoint of the bench as well as the bar.
See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 125; at 242., The authors state that:
[C]oordination involves the conscious decision to displace one's own efforts at
integration with an integrative effort that can be communicated to, and followed by, a
large number of dispersed individuals within the judiciary. For an idea to coordinate
individual judges' integration processes, it must be continuous with existing_legal
doctrine; that is, it must be perceived by judges as a natural outgrowth of that doctrine,
rather than a radical departure.
!d. Accord Shapiro, supra note 199, at 133 (discussing "cybernetic feedback" and "syntactic
feedback").
204
Shapiro, supra note 199, at 131.
.
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thus connect points in the network that might otherwise remain distant.
Litigators bear into court messages such as, "a court like yours over in Arizona
has adopted this particular theory of contributory negligence, and you should
adopt it too, your honor." Moreover, litigators carry these messages not because
they hanker after some system-wide doctrinal coherence, but rather because they
want to score a client victory and collect the big fee. Yet from this hodgepodge
of motivations, institutional constraints, and individual actions, system content is
ordered and nortns emerge.

V. APPLICATION AND EXTENSION

A. Bankruptcy as an Example of a Self-Organizing Legal System
The self-organizing model elaborated in the previous Part establishes the
following: (1) the structure of self-organizing systems is characterized by
networks containing actors related to each other by ties of varying strength; and
(2) the dynamics of self-organizing systems involve (a) a process of form
innovation, including strategic choices by system actors and the transportationcum-distortion offorn1s from other systems, and (b) a process of norm emergence
whereby fonns most fit to the system's environment come to characterize the
system. This Section applies the self-organizing model to bankruptcy law.
,,.
'

I. Self-organizing structures: bankruptcy networks
Figure 6 represents a networks-based model of the bankruptcy legal
206
system. As Figures 4 and 5 depict a business finn's communities overlapping
with each other and with extra-firm conununities, Figure 6 depicts the same
structural relationships as played out in the bankruptcy legal system.

205

See, e.g., STROGATZ, supra note 170, at 249 (providing example of how "small-world
architecture apparently fostered global coordination more efficiently"); W ATIS, supra note 170, at
3 7-42 (explaining small-world problem).
206
This figure could be filled out a bit more. There is an important set of networks engaged
in bankruptcy policymaking, including Congress, lobbyists, commentators, etc., that substantially
overlaps with the communities represented in Figure 6. See Clune, supra note 66, at 55-57
(contrasting downward cycles wherein policy is fot rned, deployed, and acted upon, with upward
cycles wherein insiders and outsiders impact policymaking). The figure could also represent that
most of the "Commentators" community is engaged primarily in analyzing the doctrine produced
by the appellate networks, with only a relatively small group of scholars interested primarily in the
activities of trial networks. See id.
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Clients

the Bar and other Legal Professionals,__

Apellate
Courts

Courts

Chair of Genet·al Motors

Jud¥ Robert Martin

Acceptan(e Corporation,

Briw, W~O. WI.

£ric A. Feldstein

General Counsel of
<Mnetal Motors
Accept•nce Corporation.,
Richard B. Wagner

Partner at Foley • Lardner
fn Madi JOn. WJ.
Michael 8. VanSlckltn

Inset

The inset (represented at the bottom of Figure 6) magnifies a portion of the
networks using the "graph theory" utilized in Figure 5. The inset shows the
relationships between four specific actors, initially located in three different
groups: Judge Martin in "Bankruptcy Courts," clients Feldstein and Wagner from
General Motors Acceptance Corporation in "Clients," and attorney VanSicklen
in "Members of the Bar and Other Legal Professionals." These four actors are
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connected by ties of varying strength: strong ties connect Martin to VanSicklen
207
and Feldstein to Wagner, and a semi -strong tie connects Wagner to VanS icklen.
Figure 6 illustrates a few specific points. First, note that the various actors in
a given system stand in a position of mutual influence. Contrary to conventional
imagination, the targets of legal regulation are not subordinated to the
regulators rather, the dynamic between regulators and targets of regulation is
208
more "back-and-forth" than "top-down."
Note also that Figure 6 represents trial and appellate networks side-by-side,
rather than the conventional imagination of trial networks operating below
appellate networks~ This representation rejects hierarchical imagery and suggests
that trial and appellate networks are, in some sense, coequal each with
independent access to authority and each executing separate but related
209
functions.
While the trial and appellate networks are substantially coequal, they are also
210
substantially different. Figure 6 represents the trial and appellate groups as two
distinct but cooperating networks. What delineates the difference between these
two networks? One conventional answer is that the trial network is engaged
primarily in the administration of benefits and burdens, while the appellate
network is interested mainly in the pronouncement and consolidation of
211
doctrine. But this characterization is partial and misleading. The trial network
makes a sustained and regular effort to announce doctrine, and the appellate
network shows occasional interest in the administrative tasks of bankruptcy (at
least when it attempts to justify its positions on policy grounds). Fact versus law
distinctions are similarly under-explanatory.
I suggest that a chief distinction between trial and appellate networks lies in
their preeminent means of ordering. While appellate networks occasionally self-

207

Note that these four actors constitute a separate network for the purposes of a given
transaction, i.e., a network in actus. In any living system, manifold networks in actus spring up
spontaneously. Some are fleeting, others endure.
208
In his important work on implementation, Bill Clune observed that governmental regulation
is often initiated by the targets of regulation (e.g., the private businesses subject to the regulation),
and that all regulation exhibits more of a "back-and-forth" dynamic than a "top-down" dynamic.
See id. at 74; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity ofLegal Regulation: Grievance
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406,412-45 (1999) (discussing how private finns
subject to legal regulation actively construct tenns of their own compliance).
209
See infra Part V.A.2.(a) (providing example of how trial and appellate courts execute
separate but related functions).
210
There are, of course, many more than two bankruptcy networks. There are at least 326 trial
networks (one for each bankruptcy court) and at least twelve appellate networks (one for each U.S.
court of appeals that takes bankruptcy cases), plus manifold and shifting combinations, each
yielding its own, perhaps fleeting, network in actus. Figure 6 presents the "ideal types" of this mass
of networks.
211
See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17,
28 (1981) (describing central court as imposer of uniforn1ity).
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order (e.g., an appeals court deciding a question of first impression), and trial
networks often bear the imprint of hierarchy, such instances are uncharacteristic.
The typical means of ordering is hierarchical for appellate networks and selforganization for trial networks.
212
For bankruptcy's appellate networks, the hierarchical model does explain
much of ordering. Hierarchical mechanisms succeed in ordering appellate system
content mainly because of small numbers the sheer amount of actors and data
to be managed is relatively low. The smaller number of courts and decisions in
appellate networks makes it possible to intend, and even occasionally to achieve,
a semblance of system-wide consistency. The prototype of deliberate hierarchical
ordering is, of course, the U.S. Supreme Court. Because there is only one court
to consider (making the sheer amount of relevant data relatively low), the U.S.
213
Supreme Court can, and does, pursue consistency as one of its chief goals.
When you can count all the relevant data on your fingers, there is no need to look
past the obvious to answer the question: "What orders system content?"
Bankruptcy's trial networks, on the other hand, order content in a complex
214
environment of large numbers. The study of bankruptcy trial networks directs
our attention past hierarchical models of ordering and towards a more complex
model of self-organization.
2. Self-organizing dynamics: empirical evidence

This Subsection presents evidence of form innovation and norm emergence
in bankruptcy. Beyond listing specific instances of fortns and potential nortns that
comprise some of the bankruptcy system's variable content, I will present ( 1) a
detailed case study of a particular fortn (called lien-stripping) that demonstrates
important features of the process of form innovation, and (2) quantitative evidence
from a substantial database of valuation opinions that suggests certain norms have
emerged non-hierarchically.

212

The bankruptcy appellate networks would include at least the judges and court staff,
lawyers, clients, and commentators acting in the vicinity of the U.S. Supreme Court, the twelve U.S.
courts of appeals commonly hearing bankruptcy cases, and the various district courts hearing
bankruptcy cases.
213
Note, for example, the degree to which the U.S. Supreme Court engages in fictions of
continuity (e.g., claiming "this Court held in 1946," when in fact no one on this Court was a
member of "this Court" in 1946) when justifying its positions.
214
The bankruptcy trial networks would include at least the judges, court staff, lawyers,
clients, near-clients, non-clients, and commentators acting in the vicinity of the 326 U.S. bankruptcy
courts.

•

No. 2]

SELF-ORGANIZING LEGAL SYSTEMS

547

(a) Form innovation: a case study
Form innovation abounds. The forms that make up the vast and variable
content of the bankruptcy system are generated primarily by the creative action
216
215
of actors such as attorneys (trying to achieve client objectives) and judges
17
(receiving or rejecting attorneys' arguments). Examples are numerous/ and
218
would include such cleverly named devices as the "Chapter 20," the "pre220
219
pack, " and the "liquidating 11. "
Sometimes, however, the legal actor is more transmitter than creator of an
innovation. Fortns are occasionally imported from extra-legal systems (e.g.,
cormnercial systems of debt collection) to the bankruptcy system. These forms
become distorted as they move from extra-legal systems to legal systems
221
(transportation-cum-distortion), and between trial networks and appellate

215

See supra text accompanying notes 195-203 (discussing Shapiro's "litigational market");
LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 176, at 1405-06.
216
See supra text accompanying notes 185-92 (discussing Feeley and Rubin's insights on
creation of legal doctrine).
217
Some examples of content variation in bankruptcy, in addition to those already mentioned
supra text accompanying notes 77-93, include: (1) whether separate classification of student loan
creditors in a Chapter 13 plan is "unfair discrimination" under section 1322(b)( 1). In re Gonzales,
206 B.R. 239, 241-42 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997) (listing twenty-five cases with different results); (2)
whether attorney's fees accrued post-petition by unsecured creditors are allowable as claims against
the estate under section 506(b). United Merch. & Mfr., Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of
the U.S. (In reUnited Merch. & Mfr., Inc.), 674 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1982), Tri-State Homes, Inc.
v. Mears (In re Tri-State Homes, Inc.), 56 B.R. 24, 25-26 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); (3) whether
exemptions planning, without more, is extrinsic evidence of fraud. First Texas Savings Ass'n, Inc.
v. Reed (In re Reed), 700 F.2d 986,990-92 (5th Cir. 1983), Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveton,
848 F.2d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 1988); (4) whether "implied representation" states a theory under
section 523(a)(2). LA Capitol Fed. Credit Union v. Melancon (In re Melancon), 223 B.R. 300, 305
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1998), AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Alvi (In re Alvi), 191 B.R. 724, 732
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996); (5) what constitutes "undue hardship" in dischargeability of student loans.
McGinnis v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re McGinnis), 289 B.R. 257,264 65 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 2003), In re Pace, 288 B.R. 788, 791-92 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003).
218
A Chapter 20 occurs when a consumer debtor files under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
successively, obtaining the full benefits of both chapters. This debtors' strategy was expressly
blessed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991). As an
example of the ukase-rejection pattern, supra text accompanying notes 185-92, Chapter 20
strategies are still rejected by some bankruptcy courts despite the blessing from the pinnacle of the
federal hierarchy. See LoPucki, Law in Lawyers' Heads, supra note 43, at 1534-36.
219
A pre-packaged bankruptcy occurs when a finn negotiates a plan of reorganization prior
to filing a petition under Chapter 11. See, e.g., Pre-Petition Comm. of Select Asbestos Claimants
v. Combustion Eng' g, Inc. (In re Combustion Eng' g, Inc.), 292 B.R. 515, 517 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)
(describing debtor's pre-packaged plan).
220
A liquidating 11 occurs when a debtor-in-possession files a plan that would liquidate, rather
than reorganize, the firm. See, e.g., In re Rickel & Assocs., Inc., 260 B.R. 673, 674-75 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing liquidating plan filed by debtor).
221
See supra text accompanying notes 180-83 (discussing Teubner).
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networks within legal systems (the ukase·rejection pattem}. This intersystem
and inter-network friction contributes to the variable system content (i.e., the
multiplicity of fom1s) that we observe in bankruptcy legal systems.
A case study illustrates these features of transportation-cum-distortion and
ukase-rejection. I will track the movement of a particular form, known as lienstripping, through the following steps: (1) the origination of the forrn in the extralegal system of commercial debt collection; (2) the transportation of the form from
that extra-legal system to the trial networks of the bankruptcy legal system; (3) the
distortion of the form incident to its transportation; (4) the development, by trial
network actors, of practices designed to ameliorate problems caused by the
distortion; (5) the transportation of the form from trial networks to appellate
223
networks, where the U.S. Supreme Court, in Dewsnup v. Timm, issued a ukase
against the form; and (6) the effective rejection of that ukase by bankruptcy's trial
networks.
At the outset, I note that I recount the saga of lien-stripping and Dewsnup not
224
to make a policy point. This Article does not focus on whether lien-stripping is
good or bad. The lien-stripping story merely provides an example of the
interaction among various types of networks and the interpenetration of their
respective forms. The case study of lien-stripping gives us a feel for the semiautonomous structure of networks, and illustrates the dynamics of transportationcum-distortion and ukase-rejection that characterize form innovation in selforganizing systems.
I shall define lien-stripping first as a market strategy and then as a legal
strategy. In either case, the basic effect of a lien-stripping strategy is to define a
debt (typically by bi.furcating the debt into two parts) based upon a valuation of
the collateral.

•

222

See supra text accompanying notes 185-92 (discussing Feeley & Rubin).
223
502 U.S. 410 (1992). See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 4 79, 516-2 0 ( 1997) (noting Dewsnup instance of"shared mental model" operated
well at trial level, but was misunderstood at appellate level).
224
The nonnative evaluation of forms often follows on the he·e ls of objective empirical work
that identifies the importation of fonns from beyond the legal system. See, e.g., Marianne B.
Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical Study ofReaffirmation, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 709, 711-13 (1999) ("[U]ndertaking empirical research to learn how frequently
Chapter 7 debtors reaffinn, which debts they reaffinn, how much they agree to pay, and whether
they can afford it."). The important work by Culhane and White demonstrated a practice in which
unsecured lenders pressure debtors to reaffinn debts that otherwise would have been discharged in
bankruptcy. Legal actors have explicitly targeted this practice (qua form, in the vernacular of this
Article) for elimination as a matter of good policy. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing policy
approaches to doctrine) .

•
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At market, suppose a bank lends a debtor $15,000 and secures the debt by
taking a security interest in the debtor's car, which is worth $13,000. If the debtor
defaults on the loan, the relevant commercial actors (i.e., the bank and the debtor)
can typically do one of two things that would effectively divide the $15,000 debt
into two parts, based upon the value of the car. First, the debtor could surrender
the car to the bank, which could then sell it and realize the $13,000 market value
(less the costs of liquidation). The bank, contractually owed $15,000, would
continue to have a claim against the debtor for the $2000 balance, but that claim
would be unsecured and the bank would have to resort to state law collection
remedies (e.g., garnishing the debtor's wages, seizing the debtor's assets) to
collect the unsecured portion of the debt. In the alternative, the bank can repossess
and liquidate the collateral, realizing the same result (i.e., $13,000 in its pocket
226
and an outstanding unsecured claim for $2000).
At law, suppose the debtor files for bankruptcy protection, and the bank
claims it is owed $15,000 and has a lien in the car. Often, the bankruptcy court
will order that the car be left with the debtor. The court will then perform a
valuation of the car, finding, say, the value to be $13,000. The court will then
bifurcate the bank's claim into two parts: a $13,000 claim that will be treated as
secured and thus receive certain statutory privileges that heighten the chance of
repayment, and a $2000 claim that will be treated as unsecured.
Both at market and law, the essence of lien-stripping is that a debt is defined
(typically by being bifurcated into two parts) based upon a valuation of the
collateral. At market, the valuation is by exchange; at law, the valuation is
performed judicially. At market, the debtor will often lose the car; at law the
debtor often keeps the car. But the basic content of lien-stripping remains the
same, whether performed at market or at law: the initial debt is defined in two
parts based upon a valuation of the collateral.
The strategy oflien-stripping arose commercially, among actors in the world
ofdebt collection, and was transported to the bankruptcy legal system as a remedy
227
at law. Many debtors file for bankruptcy expressly to take advantage of lien-

225

A lender's claim against a borrower is secured when the lender has taken, and the borrower
has given, a property interest (known as a security interest or a lien) in an item (known as
collateral) typically held by the borrower. A common example of a secured claim is a mortgage,
which gives the lender a right to foreclose on the borrower's house if borrower defaults on the loan.
226
The threat of repossession is a most effective debt-collection tool for car lenders. Typically,
the car lender's collection efforts are greatest during the period right after it makes the loan, when
the loan-to-value ratio is most unbalanced and the lender is most at-risk if the debtor chooses to
default.
227
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes lien-stripping, in at least the following: §
506, § 722, §1123(b)(5), § 1322(b)(2), and plans under Chapter 12.
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stripping, and commentators regard lien-stripping as serving basic bankruptcy
228
goals.
But the form's transportation has also worked the form's distortion, and has
led to problems in the way that lien-stripping is implemented by legal actors. The
creditor and the debtor (stripped of their bargaining bluffs) will admit that the
creditor is entitled to a secured claim worth the value of the collateral. The real
question about lien-stripping comes at the point of valuation: if the secured
portion of the debt is to be pegged to the value of the collateral, how does one
229
determine the value of the collateral? In the nonlegal system of commercial debt
collection, the problem of valuation is settled by exchange an item is worth what
it sells for. Problems arise when the collateral is valued by some process other
than an actual exchange or market transaction. Distortion is introduced when a
scheme of commerce is founded (as our commercial scheme certainly is) on the
assumption that exchange settles value, and then rights of commercial parties are
modified by a law that allows something besides exchange to settle value.
Bankruptcy law allows a legal valuation of property to substitute a market
valuation of that property, and the potential spread between those two valuations
is the primary concern with lien-stripping.
Returning again to our example of the $13,000 car: suppose that the judicial
230
valuation sets the value of the car at $10,000, even though everybody knows
that the exchange value of the car would be closer to $13,000. Maybe the judge
just makes a mistake. Or maybe the judge is pursuing some goal other than
verifying the ex ante market expectations of the bargaining parties (e.g., goals
such as wealth redistribution, or establishing the debtor's fresh start). Now the
creditor is clearly getting less than tt would have bargained for.
As it turns out, however, the problem of the potential spread is a quandary
more abstract than actual. When applying a lien-stripping remedy, actors in
bankruptcy's trial networks have developed multiple techniques designed to peg
231
the collateral's value to an actual exchange value: the collateral is judicially
valued incident to an actual sale at which the exchange of the collateral (or
comparable property) took place. This exchange value is precisely what the
secured creditor countenanced when it made the loan and took the lien, and is no
more or less than it would have gotten at a full and fair bargaining ex post.

228

See, e.g., Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of
Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373,419-420 (1991) (arguing that elimination of lien-stripping
is bad policy and is contrary to Congress' concern with creditor misbehavior).
229
See Barry E. Adler, Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, I 0 BANKR. DEV. J. l, 13
( 1993-94) (implying that valuation is linchpin of lien-stripping).
230
That is, a ruling pursuant to a section 506(a) hearing.
231
See LoPucki, supra note 223, at 517 n.l65 (indicating that section 725 allows for
distribution of collateral directly to secured creditors during course of bankruptcy, and section
363(t) allows court to sell property during course of bankruptcy, thus finding exchange price).
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Lien-stripping thus illustrates both the process of transportation-cumdistortion that characterizes form innovation, and the means of ameliorating
distortion that is developed by the system receiving the fortn. Conscious of the
importance in allowing lien-strips at a price that is close to (or inforn1ed by)
exchange value, trial networks developed norms of vague flexibility designed to
capture the usefulness of lien-stripping while mitigating (or perhaps justifying on
independent grounds) its excesses and potential problems.
The lien-stripping story also illustrates the ukase-rejection pattern of
distortion in the interactions between the trial and appellate networks of
bankruptcy's legal system. In Dewsnup, the U.S. Supreme Court scrutinized the
232
practice oflien~stripping as it flourished in the trial networks, The Court looked
at the intricate apparatus carefully developed by the trial networks to adapt a
useful commercial form to legal purposes, and saw instead something that looked
233
like an illicit "taking" of property. Once alerted to the alleged "problem of the
potential spread," the Court dealt with it in the manner common to appellate
234
networks: it issued a categorical and peremptory ukase banishing the practice
235
of lien-stripping.
In the classic fashion of signaling a complete lack of
confidence in its declaration, the Court limited its holding to the facts of the case
236
for no particularly principled reason.
Trial networks responded to the ukase by continuing the practice of lienstripping virtually unabated in every context except the one specifically enjoined

232

Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,413-14 (1992).
233
According to the Court in Dewsnup, lien-stripping would
freeze the creditor's secured interest at the judicially determined valuation. By this
approach, -the creditor would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the
property by the time-ofthe foreclosure sale. The increase would accrue to the benefit
of the debtor, a result some of the parties describe as a "windfall."
!d. at 41 7. This particular conception uf the problem of the potential spread is, as LoPucki points
out, base~ on a set of misunderstandings about what actually happens in a bankruptcy. See LoPucki,
supra note 223, at 517-18. In the Supreme Court's imagination, there is the section 506(a) judicial
valuation of the property, followed by a large time gap during which the property's value might
appreciate, followed finally by a foreclosure (i.e., an actual sale of the property establishing an
exchange value) at which it is shown that the section 506(a) valuation was too low and the debtor
nets a windfall. Dewsnup, 502 U.S~ at 417. In the real world, however, the foreclosure may not
happen at all. If it does, and if the nature of the property and the conditions of the market suggest
that there might be an appreciation, the_court and parties have access to ample techniques that will
avoid any time gap or creditor's loss of appreciation. See LoPucki, supra note 223, at 517-18.
234
·
See supra Part IV.C.2.(a) (Feeley and Rubin discussion of the "ukase").
235
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-20. Contrary to the popular view of the U.S. Supreme-Court as
a group of superheroes standing astride the law, one is almost inclined to characterize the Court in
Dewsnup as a dim giant who blunders upon a mass of delicate machinery and, not liking what it
does not understand, smashes it all to bits before grunting contentedly and moving on.
236
/d~ at 416-17 ("We ... focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their
legal resolution on another day."); id. at417 n.3 ("[W]e express no opinion as to whether the words
'allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code_.").
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237

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dewsnup,
and otherwise "channel[ing]
strategically-minded debtors into alternative strategies that reached the same
238
result, though probably with higher transaction costs. "
The lien-stripping saga demonstrates how bankruptcy's trial and appellate
networks often seem to be going about their business separately. They are
concerned about different matters, employ different methodologies, even speak
239
different languages. Sometimes the hierarchically inferior trial networks will
effectively reject an express command of the hierarchically superior appellate
240
networks.

237

That is, use of section 506(d) to lien strip in a Chapter 7 where the collateral is real estate.
238
LoPucki, supra note 223, at 518 (citation omitted).
239
See id. at 516. LoPucki states that:
In the traditional view, the United States Supreme Court stands at the pinnacle of the
United States legal system. As cases make their way through the . . . court
system ... the most important issues become the subjects of appeals. They can reach
the Supreme Court only if the Court agrees that they are of a certain level of
importance. This system of appeals is generally considered to have as one of its goals
uniform interpretation of the Constitution, statutes, and other legal doctrine. From the
perspective of participants in the many law-related systems that can fall subject to
Supreme Court review, the view is quite different. Supreme Court intervention in any
particular system is quite rare. When it occurs, the Supreme Court brings to the task a
virtually complete lack of expertise in the system and applies methods unlikely to
enlighten it. ... [T]he Court is a wild card, striking unexpectedly and focusing not on
the system but on some highly specific facet of it. The Supreme Court's
methods principally interpretating statutes and applying precedent place the focus
on petty distinctions in wording, history, and fictional intentions.
I d. (citation omitted).
24
°Compare Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 (1997) (establishing
alleged valuation standard for reorganization cases), with In re Lyles, 226 B.R. 854 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1998) ("[T]he Glueck case presents the proper method of valuing collateral."); In re Glueck,
223 B.R. 514, 519 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998) ("Rash .. . did not provide a definitive starting point.");
In re Oglesby, 221 B.R. 515,518-19 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) ("The Oglesby case is a good example
of the diverse positions parties assert while using the same Rash replacement-valuation standard.");
In re Younger, 216 B.R. 649, 653 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (outlining problems with Rash
decision). Compare Bank of Am. Nat' I Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
to absolute priority rule could be instituted in
434, 43 7 ( 1999) (providing that new value exception
.
an auction environment), with In re Dow Coming Corp., 287 B.R. 396, 408 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2002) ("The Court finds 203 N. LaSalle is inapplicable to the issue before the Court."); In re Zenith
Elecs. Corp., 241 B.R. 92, 106 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) ("It is not appropriate to extend the ruling of
the 203 North LaSalle case beyond the facts of that case."). Compare Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S.
36, 52-53 ( 1986) (holding restitution orders nondischargeable in Chapter 7 case), with Dep't ofPub.
Welfare v. Johnson-Allen (In re Johnson-Allen), 69 B.R. 461,462 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1987) (holding
restitution orders dischargeable in Chapter 13 case). Compare Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 14 (2000) ("We conclude that 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) does not provide
an administrative claimant an independent right to use the section to seek payment of its claim."),
with Official Comm. ofUnsecured Creditors v. Pardee (In re Stanwich Fin. Servs. Corp.), 288 B.R.
24, 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002) (rejecting respondent's argument which was based on Hartford
Underwriters). Avellino and Bienes v. M. Frenvilfe Co. (In reM. Frenville Co.), in which the court
•
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More generally, the life of the form called lien-stripping illustrates important
phenomena associated with form innovation, specifically the processes of
transportation-cum-distortion and ukase-rejection.
Turning from forms to nortns, we now explore whether bankruptcy legal
systems contain evidence of non-hierarchical norm emergence.

(b) Norm emergence: quantitative evidence
A form becomes a norn1 when it comes to characterize system content. In
hierarchically ordered systems, norms happen by fiat when a hierarchically
superior actor selects a particular fonn. It is this mere act of selection (followed
by subsequent acts of obedience by hierarchically inferior actors) that makes a
nortn.
In self-organizing systems, nonns emerge through a complex process of
241
selection. Sometimes norms emerge when actors imitate a particular innovation
known for its excellence at resolving a problem. An example of this sort of nonn
emergence is the spread of''fast-track" procedures for small business bankruptcies
that were developed in the Eastern District ofNorth Carolina. This particular form
242
has spread to many other jurisdictions.
This sort of innovation, without

defined claim narrowly~ 744 F.2d 332, 337-38 (3d Cir. 1984), is an example of a court of appeals
ukase that was universally rejected by bankruptcy courts. See also David Gray Carlson, Surcharge
and Standing: Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) After Hartford Underwriters, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J.
43,44 45 (2002) ("Hartford Underwriters therefore continues the Supreme Court's recent losing
streak in its attempt to legislate rules for bankruptcy proceedings. In truth, the bankruptcy process
has a dynamism of its own that simply will not tolerate unworkable mandarin decrees from on
high." (citations omitted)). Additionally, Sniadach v. Family Financial Corp., where the Court
concluded that a state wage garnishment statute violated Due Process, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969),
and Fuentes v. Shevin, holding that state replevin statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment; 407
U.S. 67, 96 (1972) present two instances where it is unclear whether the U.S. Supreme Court's
imposition of heightened constitutional requirements upon state debt collection remedies actually
changed the practice of debt collection ''on the ground." See generally Walter F. Murphy, Lower
Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 1017, 1021-30 (1959) (detailing
how lower courts use procedural or interpretive devices to circumvent general policies advanced
by Supreme Court decisions); Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to
State Courts Since 1941, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (1954) (examining cases in which, on
remand, lower court evaded Supreme Court's mandate). But cf Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court
Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. Svs. J. 208, 208
(1978) (claiming U.S. Supreme Court'scapacity to lead judicial system may be considerably greater
than the existing research indicates).
241
See supra Part IV.C.2.(b) (discussing emergence of norms).
242
See Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role ofPrecedent in the Quest for First Principles
in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions,
74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 190 n.86 (2000). Ponoroff states that:
By now, most bankruptcy professionals are familiar with the 'fast-track' procedures
pioneered by Judge A. Thomas Small, Jr. in the Eastern District of North Carolina to
streamline and expedite the process for small businesses. Judge Small did lobby
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legislation (or other hierarchical command), demonstrates the adaptive properties
that characterize self-organizing systems.
More general evidence of the adaptive activities of bankruptcy's trial
networks comes to us from Daniel Bussel's study of bankruptcy opinions that
243
were subject to "legislative vetoes" by the U.S. Congress. One significant
finding of Bussel's work was that a large proportion of the court cases that
received the corrective attention of Congress emanated from bankruptcy courts,
rather than the more hierarchically superior appellate courts. Bussel writes:
While it may in part reflect the law professor's tendency to focus on
appellate decisions, I was surprised by [the fmding that Congress acted
to "veto" decisions rendered by bankruptcy courts]. I imagined that
bankruptcy court decisions would have very low visibility with the
Congress and that those adversely affected by bankruptcy court
decisions would be far more likely to appeal or relitigate the issue in the
244
next case than to seek an amendment from Congress.
Bussel's alleged anomaly (i.e., that Congress would bother to veto the
interpretations ofhierarchically inferior courts) is, of course, completely resolved
by the self-organizing model: actors in bankruptcy's trial networks regularly
develop administrative techniques and other forms. Some of these forms take hold
and spread to other bankruptcy trial networks, achieving a sort of normative status
even in the absence of external direction. Occasionally, one of these forms may
make the jump to, and receive the (often unwelcome) scrutiny of, an appellate
245
network. Much more frequently, the forms (including those forms that may
have achieved the status of nortns) of bankruptcy's trial networks remain unappealed.246 Yet these forms, despite being the creation of hierarchically
insignificant courts, affect both the disposition of a large number of cases and the
allocation of a large number of dollars. For this reason, forms generated by
bankruptcy's trial networks receive the attention, including the negative attention,
of Congress when it sets about the task of revising or clarifying the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.
My own empirical research on bankruptcy valuation, which occasioned the
theoretical exposition offered in this Article, also contains evidence of emergent

Congress to codify a special reorganization chapter, but the failure of Congress to
respond has not impeded the efforts of Judge Small to adapt the present statute to the
needs of particular types of cases and Judge Small's model has been followed across
the country.

!d.
243

Bussel, Failures, supra note 39, at 889.
244
/d. at 918.
245
See supra Part V.A.2.(a) (discussing lien-stripping).
246
See supra Part II.B (discussing appeals problem in bankruptcy).
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nortns in bankruptcy's trial networks regarding some aspects of valuation in
247
business cases. From this quantitative database on bankruptcy valuation, I offer
three examples of the entry of fortns into the bankruptcy legal system and the
possible emergence ofnortns over time, (1) debtors' use of discounted cash flow
valuation models, (2) debtors' use of valuation models based on comparables, and
(3) creditors' overall valuation standard. Note that all three figures represent
descriptive statistics for the published cases from 1979-1998. I make no
inferential claims with these data.
•

(i) Debtors' use of discounted cash flow
Figure 7 charts and graphs the means representing debtors' use of discounted
248
249
cash flow ("DCF") models over time. Figure 7 also displays a ''trendline" to
accent the general flow of the data.

247

1n an empirical study funded by grants from the National Conference ofBankruptcy Judges
and the American Bankruptcy Institute, I have compiled and statistically analyzed two substantial
databases (one covering consumer exemption cases, the other covering business cramdown cases)
ofU.S. bankruptcy court opinions covering the twenty-yearperiod from 1979 through 1998. I shall
report more fully on the findings in two forthcoming publications: Bernard Trujillo, Valuation in
Business Cramdowns (forthcoming); Bernard Trujillo, Valuation in Consumer Exemption Cases
(forthcoming). The source of the next three figures is my "business cramdown" database: all
bankruptcy court opinions reported by Westlaw from 1979 through 1998 containing valuation issues
under Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b). Specifically, the database contains all cases in the Westlaw
library FBKR-BCT responding to the search term "51 K3563 51 K3564 51 K3565 & DA(AFT 1978
& BEF 1999)" (yield: 388 cases) and which contain one or more numerical valuations of an asset
by the bankruptcy court (total observations: 180). A case is a "cramdown" under section 1129(b)
when the court considers confinning a plan ofreorganization despite the fact that a class of creditors
has voted against the plan. In order to cram a plan down the throats of a class of dissenting creditors,
certain "cramdown rights" of the dissenting class must be respected, which cramdown rights entail
a judicial valuation of the creditors' claims.§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), (A)(iii), (B)(i).
248
A discounted cash flow model estimates the present value of future expected cash receipts
and expenditures. The model is typically generated by a financial professional who is introduced
as an expert witness. The financial expert will estimate the finn's future cash flows and then
discount those expected future returns to present value through the use of a discount rate. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 73-78 (5th ed.
1996) (explaining conceptual and mathematical application of discounted cash flow analysis for
business valuation).
249
Cases where the debtor used a DCF model were coded as "I." Cases where the debtor did
not use a DCF model were coded as "0." The mean represents the average use of DCF models by
all debtors in a given year. For example, in 1992 the debtor used a DCF model in about forty-three
percent of the cases (in fifty-seven percent of the cases the debtor did not use a DCF model). For
clarity of presentation, Figures 7, 8, and 9 do not display years that contain zero or one observation
of the relevant variable.
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Figure 7 shows a gentle and steady upward trend in the use of DCF models
over time. DCF models were relatively rare in 1982, but became fairly common
by 1998. These data support the interpretation that in the early 1980s, the use of
DCF evidence, already quite common in business and financial systems, entered
the bankruptcy legal system and gradually became something of a regular arrow
in the quiver of debtors in Chapter 11 cases. Sometime after 1985, the use ofDCF
models in cramdown valuation proceedings became, in the vernacular of this
250
article, a regular form available to system participants.
(ii) Debtors' use of comparables
Figure 8 charts and graphs the means representing debtors' use of
251
comparables-based valuation models and also shows data for the standard
252
deviation over time.

250

We might interpret the increased usage of DCF models by bankruptcy courts as a spread
of"managerial norms" from business networks to legal networks. See generally Lauren B. Edelman
et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW
& Soc;Y REv. 497, 51 I (1993) (finding that businesses translate legal directives into managerial
norms).
251
A valuation model based on "comparables'' estimates an asset's value by looking to the
known values of other, ostensibly similar, assets. See, e.g., MARK GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN,
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 368 (1998) (mentioning use of comparable riskadjusted discount rates from other fnms to value project investment opportunites).
252
The standard deviation represents how widely the values are dispersed from the mean. A
high standard deviation represents that the mean was achieved by averaging widely disparate
numbers (e.g., two values ofO and 100 have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of70. 71). A low
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Figure 8 shows steadily rising means and declining standard deviations from
1984 until 1993. From 1990 through 1993 the means are extremely high and the
standard deviations are extremely low, indicating that comparables valuation
models were robustly normative during those years. These data support the
interpretation that during the early 1990s it became a system characteristic for
253
debtors in Chapter 11 cramdowns to offer comparables-based valuation models.
In the vernacular of this Article, comparables valuation models entered the legal
system in the early 1980s as a form. For the period from the late 1980s and mid1990s, comparables become a norm of the legal system.
(iii) Creditors' valuation standard
Figure 9 charts and graphs the standard deviation of the creditors' valuation
standard over time, and also shows a "trendline" that accents the flow of the
254
data.

standard deviation represents that the mean was achieved by averaging numbers that are close
together (e.g., two values of 49 and 51 have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 1.41 ). Cases
where debtor used a comparables valuation model were coded as "1." Cases where debtor did not
use a comparables valuation model were coded as "0."
253
The low standard deviations in Figure 8 indicate that the high means were achieved by
averaging uniformly high numbers, i.e. the use of comparables was high across the board from 1990
to 1993. If it was 1992 and you were a judge hearing a cramdown, and the debtor did not produce
comparables, you would have said: "What's going on?" One should note that the system change in
favor of comparables coincided with the valuation of property in cases filed during the recession
of the early to mid-1990s. As the value of property (and particularly real estate) declined, debtors
(who are typically eager to get low valuations for their property in a cramdown hearing) would
adduce evidence drawn from the valuation of comparable properties (which values would be
depressed because of the recession).
254
The valuation standard is a variable I constructed to measure the parties' and court's
general approach to the valuation. The valuation standard variable describes a continuum between
two poles: one pole is extreme "common" value and the other pole is extreme "individual private"
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Figure 9 shows a pronounced shrinkage of the standard deviation, indicating
that the variation in the ways creditors approach valuation has diminished
markedly over time. This is a vivid example of 11-0n-hierarchical ordering. The
data support the interpretation that, in the early years, right after the enactment of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978, creditors were all over the map in the ways
they talked about valuation. As the years wore on, creditors' valuation strategies
have become less variable and more ordered. And this ordering has occurred
across multiple parties in multiple jurisdictions, all without the command-andcontrol of a hierarchical mechanism.
Summarizing the data: Figure 7 (DCF models) suggests the entry of a
business form into the legal system and the spread of that form within the legal
system. Figure 8 (comparables models) suggests a form entered the legal system
....

value. A person proceeding from a "common" valuation standard typically intends to re-sell the
asset after acquisition,-and bases her own valuation of the item upon her understanding ofthe item's
re-sale value. A person working with an "individual private'' valuation standard intends to acquire
the item for her own use or consumption, and so bases her valuation Qf the item upon her own
anticipation of gains from using or consuming the item. These two polar conceptions of value are
dr~wn from the economics literature on "auction theory." See PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION
THEORY TO WoRK 157, 162 (2004) (discussing "common" and "independent private" conceptions
of value). See generally R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan; Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 699, 704--()5 ( 1987) (discussing independent..private_value model and common value
model); Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory ofAuctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1090, 1097 ( 1982) (explaining independent-private values model and general
symmetric model); Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 3,
14-16 (1989) (explaining how value of goods is determined). The variable was coded on a scale of
1 to 8, with "1" representing extreme common value and "8'' representing extreme "individual
private value."
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and gradually spread to the point of achieving normative status. Figure 9
(creditors' valuation standard) suggests that creditors' valuation strategies have
become more ordered over time, despite the absence of exogenous or hierarchical
control. These data lend support to the claim that at least some of what we observe
in the bankruptcy system is self-organizing.

B. Self-Organization as a General Model of Trial Court Behavior
There is evidence that at least some substantial part of the content of our
bankruptcy legal system is self-organizing. In this final Section, I suggest that
bankruptcy law may not be unique. Fields of law as diverse as the law of crimes
and misdemeanors, tax law, and immigration law may also demonstrate properties
255
of non-hierarchical ordering and informal adaptation.
I have presented
bankruptcy as a case study that illustrates the principles of self-organization, but
there is reason to believe that self-organization may extend beyond bankruptcy.
I offer that the self-organizing model might be a general theory of the ordering of
legal content, helping to explain basic phenomena common to all trial courts (or
other fora of first instance, such as administrative decision makers) regardless of
256
the particular substantive areas oflaw. Undoubtedly, much of what we observe
in law is hierarchically ordered, and much is not ordered at all. But I want to
suggest that traces of self-organization may exist in areas of law beyond
bankruptcy. In the spirit of setting an agenda for future research, this Section will
briefly mention three basic problems of legal scholarship that the self-organizing
model may illuminate: discretion, doctrine, and legal change.

1. Discretion

\

Scholars and politicians often color the discretion of judges and other
. decision makers as a problem to be solved. The self-organizing model, on the
contrary, suggests that discretion is little more than a background condition for the
257
dynamics of problem-solving. A passage from Peter M. Blau is instructive:

255

Variation and adaptive system behavior are endemic; "[t]he major defect in [the precedent]
system is a mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it." Llewellyn, supra note 53, at 396
(emphasis added).
256
Self-organizing dynamics will also appear in appellate court networks where a judge is
deciding an issue of first impression. In such instances, the judge typically will select a few cases
(which she may describe as the leading cases or the better reasoned cases) as guides, while
simultaneously declining to be influenced by other cases that, at least fot mally, are similarly
situated.
257
See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299, 1299
( 1997) (suggesting that judicial discretion is presented as "problem," when it is actually ubiquitous
and unremarkable feature of modem law); Rubin & Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, supra note
185, at 2037 ("[Judicial creation oflaw] can be described, understood, and justified. It is one of the
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(I]t is still often assumed that the rational pursuit of bureaucratic
objectives requires that most members of the organization virtually
abstain from exercising rational judgment in the perforn1ance of their
duties. . . . But these considerations ignore the complexity of many
bureaucratic responsibilities and the need for change in operating
techniques. . .. [E]fficiency depends on recurrent modifications of
operating methods and is adversely affected by the time lag between the
appearance of operational difficulties and the official establishment of
remedies. In contrast, if every official is expected to be concerned with
the rational accomplishment of organizational objectives, ... necessary
adjustments will spontaneously emerge in work groups, and far more
258
rational operations become possible.
59

For those focused on tracing the authorizing pedigree of legal commands/
discretion (and especially the discretion ofunelectedjudges) is a central problem.
But for descriptions of complex systems and their adaptive and self-organizing
properties, discretion is epiphenomenal.
2. Doctrine

Legal scholarship takes doctrine very seriously. The thrust of most legal
260
research is concerned with getting the best doctrine: rule or standard? Property
262
261
rule or liability rule? Let-the-market-work or help-the-weaker-party?
Lawyers study doctrine either because we think doctrine is intrinsically
important and we care about its analytical consistency (formalism), or because we
think that doctrine can affect, for good or ill, the policy outcomes that we care

basic, quotidian elements of our legal system."). .
258
BLAU, supra note 74, at 216-17 (emphasis added).
259
That is, for those scholars undertaking an "ideological" research program, in the sense
offered by Griffiths. See Griffiths, supra note 6, at 12 ("[I]t would be impossible for a descriptive
theory to define the underlying ideas of 'difference' and 'sameness' in relation to rules and
situations, since that is a legal-doctrinal and not an empirical distinction."). See generally Abel,
supra note 9, passim (distinguishing between "law books" and "books about law").
260
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1685, 1685 (1976) ("[A]ltruist views on substantive private law issues lead to willingness
to resort to standards in administration, while individualism seems to harmonize with an insistence
on rigid rules rigidly applied.").
261
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) (discussing legal
entitlements protected by property rules versus those protected by liability rules).
262
See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 56, at 1051-52 (discussing party's "duty to read" contract
language before signing juxtaposed with issues of market autonomy versus unfair circumstances).
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263

about (realism). These two approaches to doctrine are conventionally presented
as polar opposites. From the perspective of this Article, however, the formalist
264
both study
and the realist approaches to doctrine are substantially continuous
doctrine because they care about what it says. That is, both the fortnalist and
realist approaches to doctrine are content-dependent: the content of the doctrine
determines the direction of the research.
This Article, on the contrary, states a position that is agnostic about
doctrine's specific content. From the point of view of the self-organizing model
oflegal systems, doctrine (e.g., the formal speech-acts of judges) is just one type
of system content, alongside other forms of system content such as attorney
strategies and innovations introduced by businesspersons, civil rights activists,
and other extra-system actors. A researcher inquiring into self-organizing systems
cares about system content (including doctrine) not because of what it says, but
because of what it can show us about the structure and dynamics of the legal
system and the extra-legal systems with which it intersects. In this view, studying
system content is important primarily because it provides us with the variables for
learning about the system's structure and dynamics. Research on self-organizing
legal systems takes doctrine as data.

3. Legal change
How does the content of a legal system change? What explains why certain
changes occur in a legal system's content, while other changes do not? I believe
that many important questions in legal research echo these inquiries.
The self-organizing model gives us the apparatus for beginning an
exploration. For example, the model puts us in a position to test the hypothesis
that legal innovations come from low-status networks (i.e., those affiliated with
trial courts and other fora of first instance), which receive and transport the

263

For policy-impact uses of bankruptcy empirical research, see, e.g., Braucher, supra note
43, at 582-83 (discussing whether unifotrn application of bankruptcy laws is appropriate policy
goal); Sullivan et al., Persistence, supra note 43, at 859 (suggesting that legal change should be
effectuated through educational seminars as well as amendments to fonnal rules). Compare this with
Griffiths, who writes that "empirical" (in his sense of"non-ideological") approaches to law "must
be independent of the practical concerns of the administration of state institutions." Griffiths, supra
note 6, at 23. In other words, the researcher should not engage particular variations (asking "is this
particular variation good or bad?" "can these variations be smoothed somehow?" or "can we tell
a story about judicial strategies or biases that will explain away these variations?"), but should
rather look at variation holistically and, as it \\·ere, from a distance. This distance enables the
researcher to explore the systemic properties of variation, and ask how variation fits into the entire
process of ordering.
264
See Galanter, The Portable Soc 2, supra note 6, at 252 (''I make no distinction between
believers in the model ofrules and instrumentalists; nor between forn1alist believers in autonomous
rule development and their realist critics. Thus, where some observers detect a radical break, I see
a striking continuity.").
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innovations from outside the legal system. Understanding the self-organizing
aspects of a legal system, we are put in a position to measure the role of trial
courts as bridges to extra-legal networks and primary agents of legal change.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article attempts to supplement our maps of legal reality so that they are
a bit more accurate and useful. A hierarchical map of ordering, the pyramid story,
does not account well for two prominent realities: (1) variation in the content of
the legal system, and (2) patterns of non-hierarchical ordering that we observe. A
more complete map of legal ordering must account for these realities.
I have offered a model of self-organization to explain what hierarchy cannot.
Self-organization takes as central the variation that we observe in the content of
a legal system, and attempts to state how order emerges from that variation.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, variation and order are not categories arranged
as binary opposites. Rather, variation and order compose one continuous
·
phenomenon.
Working with bankruptcy data and institutions, I have portrayed selforganizing structures as overlapping networks of legal and extra-legal actors, and
I have explained self-organizing dynamics as processes of form innovation and
norm emergence. I have adduced empirical evidence (including a substantial case
study and statistical analysis of a quantitative database) to support the proposition
that U.S. bankruptcy law is a self-organizing system. Finally, I have suggested
that the self-organizing model might provide a more general theory of trial court
behavior, and I have offered some preliminary thoughts on how the selforganizing model may illuminate basic research on discretion, doctrine, and legal
change.

•

